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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the risk effects of bank acquisitions of insurance companies and securities firms 
between 1991 and 2012 using a newly constructed dataset of M&A deals. We examine risk 
changes before and after deal announcements by decomposing risk into systematic and 
idiosyncratic components. Subsequently, we investigate the relationship between risk and 
diversification by modelling the determinants of risks. We find that bank combinations with 
securities firms yield higher risks than combinations with insurance companies. Bank size is an 
important and consistent determinant of risk whereas diversification is not. Our results inform 
the continuing debate on diversification versus functional separation of bank activities. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper contributes to the on-going policy debate on bank diversification versus functional 
separation by examining the risk profile of international banks following acquisition of non-
banking activities. It is little over a decade since the Financial Services Modernization Act 
(FSMA) of 1999 revoked functional separation to allow US bank holding companies (BHCs) to 
operate as financial conglomerates. Permitting the so-called “universal banking model” put US 
banks on equal footing with European banks, which could operate as universal firms under the 
Second Banking Directive of 1989.1 The response of the financial services industry came in the 
form of a wave of consolidation, often via mergers and acquisitions (M&A), through which 
financial institutions increased the scale and scope of their activities.2 Large and complex 
financial institutions were at the core of the 2007-09 crisis. This has triggered a new debate on 
optimal bank size, focusing either on capital surcharges for large banks (Basel III), or on the 
range of permissible activities (Volker rule in the US, and Vickers and Liikanen proposals in the 
UK and EU, respectively).  
This reaction has reignited the long-standing debate as to the costs and benefits of 
diversification (Herring and Santomero, 1990; Boyd et al., 1998; Flannery, 1999; Acharya et al., 
2006; Herring and Carmassi, 2010; Elsas et al., 2010). At the public policy level, concerns relate 
to extended monopoly powers of larger financial firms; conflicts of interest between financial 
institutions and consumers; and the possibility that nonbank financial firms could implicitly 
benefit from government subsidies targeted at banks via “too-big-to-fail” guarantees (Farhi and 
Tirole, 2012; Molyneux et al., 2014; Laeven et al, 2014). 
The perceived benefits of diversification include synergies from scope economies, efficiency 
gains and profit-enhancing cross-selling opportunities (Houston et al., 2001; Pilloff 1996; 
Vander Vennet, 2002). Furthermore, diversification may allow financial services firms to reduce 
                                                 
1
 The Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999 – also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA) – widened the range of permissible activities for banks. The process of deregulation in US banking began 
before 1999 with the first step towards thought to have occurred in 1987 when the Federal Reserve allowed Citicorp, 
Bankers Trust and JP Morgan to engage in limited underwriting and dealing in a set of securities. Several further 
steps gradually eroded the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act. The Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 (Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act) let banks expand across states and engage in geographical diversification. In Europe, 
the implementation of the Second Banking Directive by all 15 member states was completed between 1991 and 
1994.  
2
 In addition to financial deregulation, other forces encouraging consolidation in the financial sector during the 
1990s and early 2000s included: improved information technology, globalisation of financial and real markets, and 
heightened shareholder pressure for financial performance. In Europe, the introduction of the euro accelerated the 
speed of financial market integration and encouraged cross-border activity (Group of Ten 2001). 
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insolvency risk due to the imperfect correlation of profits arising from a broader set of financial 
activities. Critics, in contrast, perceive no diversification benefits and instead voice concerns 
pertaining to the existence of diseconomies of scope and greater inefficiencies at more diverse 
financial institutions (Laeven and Levine, 2007), which are deemed as more complex, difficult to 
regulate and harder to resolve (Herring and Carmassi, 2010; Chow and Surti, 2011; Gambacorta 
and van Rixtel, 2013). Indeed, plentiful evidence shows that substituting interest income with 
fee-based income increases earnings volatility (DeYoung and Ronald, 2001; Stiroh 2004; Stiroh 
and Rumble, 2006). 
Nonetheless, substantial empirical evidence suggests benefits accrue to diversified institutions 
relative to more specialised firms (Barth et al., 2000). Although much of the evidence dates from 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, policymakers appear to endorse this view. This paved the way for 
an unprecedented level of M&A activity in the financial services industry, which has contributed 
to the emergence of a number of large and increasingly complex financial institutions.3  
Following the 2007-09 crisis a growing number of academics and policymakers began to 
debate if the size and permissible activities of financial institutions should be re-constricted 
because of concerns over systemic risk. New legislation in the US and Europe now enforces a 
functional separation of impermissible investment banking activities from commercial banking.4 
Whereas the permissible investment banking activities may differ between the US and across EU 
member states, and the mechanisms to deliver separation range from institutional separation (in 
the US) to subsidiarisation (in the EU) to ring-fencing (in the UK), a common objective of 
                                                 
3
 Most M&A activity during the 1990s in the financial sector involved banking firms. Acquisitions of banking firms 
accounted for 60% (70%) of the total number (value) of financial mergers (Group of Ten, 2001). The asset share of 
the five largest BHCs in the US jumped from 21.2% to 48.0% between 1986 and 2006 (Stiroh, 2010). The evolution 
of the mean ratio of non-interest income-to-total operating income, to proxy diversification, shows that the BHCs 
increasingly diversified over time: from 39.0% in 1986 to 53.2% in 2006. Between these dates, the average BHC 
operated in more states (21 c.f. 5) and achieved greater branch penetration (3,118 c.f. 463). Berger et al. (1999) and 
Berger et al. (2001) discuss the consolidation process in the US and Europe. 
4
 The principle of the new legislation is to carve out predefined casino-like trading activities of banks. A key 
difference between the US and European approaches is that the Volcker rule in the US forbids the coexistence of 
predefined investment banking activities in different subsidiaries within the same banking group whereas the 
European and UK rules allow for subsidiarisation of such activities in separately capitalised legal entities. In the US, 
the Volcker rule is implemented in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. In 
the UK, the Vickers proposals are implemented in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013. In January 
2014, the European Commission published its proposal for a Volcker-Vickers style reform which deviates somewhat 
from the recommendations of the Liikanen report of 2012. Agreement on the final version of the European 
legislation is not expected until mid-2015 which infers an effective date of mid-2018. Mayer Brown (2014) review 
the new European proposal and how it differs from Liikanen and UK and US rulings, as well as overviewing recent 
French and German legislation. 
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structural bank regulation is the protection of the real economy and bank depositors from 
exogenous shocks and contagion effects (Chow and Surti, 2011; Krainer, 2012; Gambacorta and 
van Rixtel, 2013). Whilst these options demonstrate the objective of policymakers for large 
banks to transit their business models away from universal banking, the new rules prohibit only 
specific investment banking activities. Consequently, there is a danger that policy developments 
will neglect, or at least downplay, the possibility that banks benefit from the diversification of 
their activities into other nonbank activities, as suggested by the intermediation literature. 
The debate on diversification considers different dimensions of bank risk: the first dimension 
relates to the increase in individual bank risk deriving from increased organisational complexity 
and involvement in market-based activities. The second dimension relates to a bank's 
contribution to systemic risk. Regulatory definitions of systemically important banks (SIBs) or 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) relate to the size, complexity and 
interconnectedness of the financial institutions.5  
In a somewhat similar vein, the notion of greater system-wide risks – arising from the 
broadened scope of banking activities – is gaining ground in both theoretical (Acharya, 2009; 
Wagner, 2010; Ibragimov et al., 2011;) and empirical contributions (De Jonghe, 2010; Billio et 
al., 2012; Drenhman and Tarashev, 2013; Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibaňez, 2013). Post 2008, an 
evolving literature is tackling how best to estimate systemic risk, using a variety of indicators 
(Brownlees and Engle, 2012; Acharya et al., 2012; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2012) and to 
determine the interconnectedness of systemically-important financial institutions given that 
events have shown the incremental risk of one institution can impact several others and the 
economy at large.   
The crucial question that remains unanswered concerns the expected impact of diversification 
upon risk. Proponents of diversification argue that it decreases total risk through a reduction in 
idiosyncratic risk. Opponents of this view contend that diversification exposes financial 
institutions to the same shocks, which ultimately could adversely affect the level of financial 
stability.6 Both sides of the diversification debate are grounded on solid theoretical arguments.  
                                                 
5
 The Financial Stability Board (2011) defines Systemically Important Financial Institutions as "financial 
institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, 
would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity". 
6
 The diversification debate extends beyond the above arguments. Stiroh (2010) reviews the pertinent literature. 
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The on-going consultations on the future of banking and the wider financial architecture 
should take stock of the diversification debate. Regulatory reforms should take account of 
empirical evidence on the differences between activities that add value for shareholders without 
posing a threat to system-wide stability, and activities which could threaten financial stability, 
irrespective of possible benefits to firm shareholders. Failing to do so would not only fail to 
safeguard the soundness of the financial system but also lead to losses in terms of synergies and 
impose additional costs on the financial system (Vesala, 2009).  
This study contributes to on-going academic and policy debates on the relative merits of 
diversification. Because of the high risk of a few activities, some believe the financial crisis 
constitutes evidence that diversification does not reduce overall risk. We posit that not all forms 
of diversification exert equal effect on the risk profile of financial institutions. We test our 
hypothesis by identifying the effects on risk deriving from M&A between banks and non-bank 
financial services, including insurance companies and securities firms.  
Our empirical investigation proceeds as follows: we commence by estimating risks for 
acquiring banks before and after the announcement of M&A deals, in order to formally validate 
the hypothesis that diversification realizes lower levels of risk. To do this, we decompose [total] 
risk into systematic and idiosyncratic constituents. Next, we formally examine the relationship 
between risk and diversification in bank-nonbank partnerships. Specifically, we model the 
determinants of risks, after controlling for financial institution-specific attributes such as asset 
quality, profitability, leverage and size. Finally, we assess if the effect on risk is driven by the 
characteristics of the participating financial institutions. In order to achieve this, we construct 
three subsets of deals: (1) banks acquiring insurance companies (Bank-Insure); (2) banks 
acquiring insurance agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency); and (3) banks acquiring securities and/or 
commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). 
Our sample comprises 274 international M&A deals involving banks and nonbanks from 
1991 to 2012, making it the most comprehensive dataset in the literature on the risk effects of 
bank-nonbank takeovers. The sample period includes the major international regulatory changes 
that should impact on diversification; the implementation of the Second Banking Directive in 
Europe and the FSMA in the US. By segmenting our sample of deals into pre- and post-2007 
periods we demonstrate if, and how, the financial crisis impacted risks in bank-nonbank 
combinations.   
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Our main contribution is fourfold. First, we offer broader results on the effects of bank-
nonbank takeovers on bidder total, systematic and idiosyncratic risks, thereby extending the 
extant literature on the risk effects of conglomeration. Second, we provide novel results on the 
relationship between diversification and risk before and after bank-nonbank deals. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first study to examine this relationship within a cross-sectional 
framework while controlling for other factors. Third, we distinguish between bank 
diversification into two types of insurance business (underwriting and brokerage), and also 
securities business. Fourth, we provide unambiguous evidence of the impact of the financial 
crisis on the risks associated with diversification.  
By way of preview, our findings indicate merger-induced increases in betas for bank-
insurance combinations and increases in total (systematic and idiosyncratic) risk for bank-
securities deals. The risk increases are driven by deals that took place between 2007 and 2012, 
arguably reflecting changes in market perceptions on bank diversification. Moreover, banks’ 
choice to diversify into specific non-banking activities seems to depend on banks’ pre-
announcement profiles. A key finding of our analysis is that pre-announcement differences in 
bank profiles diminish as banks become more alike following deals. As firms grow more alike 
they become exposed to the same shocks, thus increasing the probability of simultaneous firm 
failure and leading to systemic risk (Wagner, 2010). Although our results fail to uncover 
variations in risk exposures across combinations on the basis of banks’ pre-announcement levels 
of diversification and risk, we note the importance of size, which is corroborated by our cross-
section analysis. This seems to lend some support to the view that bank size is a key variable in 
the definition of systemically important institutions, in line with the findings of Laeven et al 
(2014). Diversification effects, however, vary across combinations and between pre- and post-
announcement periods. Our analysis implies that regulators should differentiate between effects 
arising from increases in the absolute size of financial institutions, and those arising from 
diversification of activities. This is consistent with the views of Kane (2000) that the largest 
banks tend to reap most M&A benefits due to increased market power, wider political influence 
and greater access to the safety net. 
In what follows, section 2 reviews the extant contributions on the risk issues relating to 
financial conglomerates and considers the empirical evidence. Section 3 presents the sample and 
methodological framework. We discuss results in section 4 and conclude in section 5. 
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2. Bank Diversification and Risk 
The question of whether financial conglomerates outperform their more specialized 
counterparts in terms of their risk-return attributes is an issue of ongoing academic research. 
Generally, proponents of diversification (Benston, 1994; Saunders 1994) cite the existence of 
synergies through cost and revenue economies of scope coupled with lower bankruptcy risk due 
to the imperfect correlations of revenue streams from different functional activities. On the 
contrary, a basic argument against diversification is that investors can diversify away firm-
specific risk by constructing efficient portfolios at lower cost (Levy and Sarnat, 1970).7 While 
much of the evidence we discuss draws on US studies, we note the emergence of a literature 
containing evidence from Europe.8 
Despite the various methodological avenues pursued in the extant literature, the evidence is 
mixed and the question still remains. This is very apparent when one reviews academic survey 
evidence on this subject. For instance, Kwan and Laderman (1999) review the effects of 
combining banking and nonbank financial activities on bank risk and return. They report that 
securities activities, insurance broking, and insurance underwriting are riskier though more 
profitable than banking activities, and provide potential for diversification. Berger et al. (1999) 
draw similar conclusions and suggest that consolidation can help financial institutions to 
diversify their portfolio risks as well increase their profit efficiency. Berger et al. (2001) review 
the literature on the effects of consolidation on the efficiency of the European financial services 
industry. Whilst they acknowledge that consolidation may yield efficiency gains that are mainly 
attributable to risk diversification, they admit that much of the potential gain could be offset by 
barriers to consolidation.9 In a survey of 18 studies, Saunders and Walter (1994) report a lack of 
consensus as to whether nonbanking activities reduce bank risk (nine studies answer yes, six 
answer no, while three are inconclusive). 
                                                 
7
 Levy and Sarnat (1970) use portfolio theory to prove that in the absence of synergistic gains and capital cost 
economies, the diversification benefits stemming from mergers cannot produce economic gains in a perfect capital 
market. 
8
 The empirical research on financial conglomeration comprises, but is not limited to, studies that consider its effects 
on shareholder value, efficiency, and risk. To keep the task manageable, this section overviews some evidence 
relating to the risk effects of bank-nonbank deals, without intending to lessen the importance of any studies 
excluded. See Fiordelisi and Ricci (2011) and Dontis-Charitos et al. (2011) for evidence on efficiency effects and 
shareholder value effects, respectively. 
9
 The barriers include distance, language, culture and implicit rules against foreign institutions. 
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Like the survey evidence, the empirical record is inconclusive. Data unavailability and/or 
methodological issues are underlying anomalies. Heggestad (1975) uses variance/covariance 
analysis at the aggregate industry level. He finds that many nonbank activities are safer than 
banking, which suggests potential diversification benefits may exist in some nonbanking 
operations. Others employ a combination of accounting and market data to examine the 
relationship between BHC risk and diversification into nonbanking. However, the results lack 
generality: Boyd and Graham (1986) cannot identify a significant relationship between either 
profitability or risk and nonbank activity.10 Brewer (1989) fails to uncover evidence of high BHC 
risk associated with nonbank activity, though he finds a strong negative relation between risk and 
nonbank activity for high risk BHCs. Using a similar framework, Brewer et al. (1988) report a 
negative relation between the proportion of nonbank activity and BHC risk. 
The earlier literature suffers from two shortcomings. First, in studies covering periods prior to 
the 1999 FSMA Act, the regulatory model of functional separation limited the range of 
permissible nonbank activities. Second, aggregated reporting of nonbanking realised a loss of 
detail in the analysis of risks. Initial attempts to remedy these anomalies include the application 
of merger simulation techniques. Boyd and Graham (1988) analyse the impact of a hypothetical 
expansion of BHCs into nonbanking on BHC risk. They suggest that combinations between 
BHCs and securities firms, real estate developers and property and casualty (P/C) insurance 
increase both the volatility of returns and risk of failure. Yet, they also find that BHC expansion 
into life insurance reduces returns volatility and bankruptcy risk. Similarly, Laderman (1999) 
finds that life insurance underwriting, P/C insurance underwriting or securities underwriting 
reduce the probability of BHC bankruptcy. Genetay and Molyneux (1998) analyse the impact of 
on bank risk of UK banks’ expansion into mutual and proprietary life insurance. Whereas the 
combinations did significantly reduce the probability of failure, their effect on risk is ambiguous 
and the effect on the volatility of bank profitability insignificant.  
The practice of randomly selecting pairs of companies without controlling for size can create 
an unrealistic pairing of large nonbanks with small BHCs. Boyd et al. (1993) and Lown et al. 
(2000) take account of this problem. The former authors suggest that mergers between BHCs and 
life or non-life insurance firms can be risk-reducing if the appropriate portfolio weight 
                                                 
10
 The relationship between nonbank share and risk is strong and positive in a sub-period prior to the imposition of 
tighter BHC regulations. 
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combinations are chosen, whereas mergers with either securities or real estate companies are 
likely to increase BHC risk. In contrast, Lown et al. (2000) conclude that mergers between BHCs 
and either securities firms or property and casualty firms are likely to modestly raise BHC risk. 
However, mergers between BHCs and life insurance companies lower risk for both firms 
because of diversification benefits. Other authors adopt a portfolio approach: Allen and Jagtiani 
(2000) use market data to create "synthetic universal banks" and find that nonbank activities 
reduce total risk but increase systematic risk.11 Estrella (2001) claims banking institutions and 
insurance companies can experience diversification benefits by converging.  
The emergence of bank-nonbank combinations and financial conglomerates, in general, 
following deregulatory acts, paves the way for studies that investigate actual combinations 
(Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). Another strand of literature uses market data to examine the 
risk effects of bank-insurance takeovers, yet fails to yield conclusive results. Specifically, Fields 
et al. (2007) find no evidence of risk changes for 105 banks and 24 insurers. Chen and Tan 
(2011) examine changes in bidder total and systematic risk (beta) for 72 bank-insurance deals 
and confirm the result.12 In contrast, Elyasiani et al. (2014) investigate the risk-return and 
spillover effects of 82 bank-insurance deals and observe a decline in risk for bank acquirers and 
their peers. Whereas studies examine the relationship between measures of bank diversification 
and performance, and/or risk, the expected benefits of diversification for financial firms are not 
always evident, and when benefits accrue they may be offset by other factors. Using non-interest 
income share to proxy diversification, Stiroh (2004) finds diversification is associated with more 
volatile and lower risk-adjusted returns at banks. Whilst Stiroh and Rumble (2006) report 
diversification benefits for BHCs, they acknowledge the offsetting impact on risk-adjusted 
returns of greater exposure to more volatile activities. Stiroh (2006) confirms the association 
between diversification and an increasing volatility of returns at BHCs, which implies that some 
banks may be overly diversified. In a study of European banks, Baele et al. (2007) find 
diversification (non-interest revenue share) is positively associated with systematic risk, but 
contrary to Stiroh (2006), they report a negative relationship between diversification and 
                                                 
11
 The term synthetic describes universal banks that do not exist but are created for study purposes. A “synthetic 
universal bank” is effectively a portfolio consisting of one depository institution, one securities firm, and one 
insurance company. 
12
 Bidder total risk is proxied by the ratio of the variance of bidder returns to the return variance of three indices, 
namely the world index, the home market index and the home banking index. Bidder betas are calculated using each 
of the aforementioned indices. 
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idiosyncratic and total risks. Further scrutiny reveals the latter relationship to be non-linear. 
Other European evidence supports Stiroh (2006): a study of small European banks finds 
diversification and risk-adjusted performance are inversely related, inferring that small banks 
should focus on activities in which they hold comparative advantage (Mercieca et al., 2007). 
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011) show that low-risk European banks which diversify into other 
financial activities (mainly insurance) experience a marked increase in default risk. 
3. Data and Methodology 
We consider the effect of bank diversification into the insurance and securities businesses on 
the risks of acquiring institutions. Our sample of deals includes 218 bank-insurance deals and 54 
bank-securities deals listed on the Thomson One Banker M&A database between 1991 and 
2012.13 We create two subsets of the bank-insurance sample because the literature on the 
interface between banks and insurance companies highlights significant differences in the risk-
return profiles of banks between combinations with insurance agencies/brokers and insurance 
firms (Boyd et al., 1993; Dontis-Charitos et al., 2011; Nurullah and Staikouras, 2008). Failing to 
differentiate between deals when the target is an insurance underwriter – and exposed to 
underwriting risks – and deals where the target is an insurance agent/broker – where 
underwriting risk is not present – can bias results. We define the subsets as follows: Bank-Insure 
contains banks that acquire insurance companies (n = 125); Bank-Agency contains banks that 
acquire insurance agencies (n = 93). Lastly, Bank-Securities contains banks that acquire 
securities firms and/or commodities brokers (n = 54). Table 1 shows the distribution of the 
sample of bidders and targets by country and deal type. Figure 1 shows sample composition by 
year and deal type. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 shows the majority of partnerships concentrate in the US and Europe. Whereas bank 
acquisitions of insurance companies (Bank-Insure) are evenly distributed, distinct geographical 
features exist: bank acquisitions of insurance agencies (Bank-Agency) occurring mostly in the 
                                                 
13
 This sample represents all available international M&A announcements where banks acquire insurance 
companies, insurance agencies and securities firms recorded by official wire services between 1991 and 2012, 
excluding deals that involve rescue motivations and/or have incomplete/unavailable stock return data. We source 
deal information from the Thomson One Banker M&A database and verify dates using Bloomberg’s corporate 
calendar. A list detailing the deals is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
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US, with bank acquisitions of securities firms (Bank-Securities) exhibiting greater geographical 
spread. Most deals occur between 1997 and 2005.14 
3.1. Decomposition of Risk 
To gain insight into the risk effects for each type of deal, we utilise a risk decomposition 
approach and decompose the total risk facing acquiring firms into its systematic and 
idiosyncratic constituents. Starting from a generalised multi-factor model, and using a matrix 
structure, we obtain the linear return generating process for each firm i: 
 ܴ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ܤ௜′ ܨ + �௜௧                                          [1] 
 
where Ri is the logarithmic return on asset i; a is the constant term; B is a kx1 vector of exposures 
(pi, p=1,…,k) of asset i to k common risk factors; F  is the k-dimensional column vector of risk 
factors (fp); it  is a residual term with the usual properties and is uncorrelated to the k risk 
factors; and t equals time. Under this framework, the systematic return variation of asset i is: 
 �ௌ�௦ ோ�ଶ =  ∑   ∑   ߚ௣௜ ߚ௤௜ �( ௣݂ ௤݂)௞௤=ଵ,   ௣≠௤௞௣=ଵ  + ∑  ߚ௣௜ଶ  �ଶ( ௣݂)௞௣=ଵ                          [2] 
where  (fp fq) is the covariance among risk factors p and q. Given that we employ a single index 
market model15, asset’s i systematic variation to market risk boils down to k = 1 in equation [2]: 
 �ௌ�௦ ோ�ଶ =  ሺߚ��  ���ሻଶ = �ோ�ଶ −  ���ଶ                                                              [3] 
where, �ோ�ଶ   and  ���ଶ   are the total and idiosyncratic exposures of asset i, respectively. 
We estimate equation [1] for a pre-announcement period (day -250 to day -1) and a post-
announcement period (day +1 to day +250) separately, using daily stock prices for acquiring 
institutions and the stock market index where each acquirer is traded. We source data from 
                                                 
14
 Prior to the FSMA in 1999, a number of US deals took place under specific regulatory permissions. Ten deals that 
fall into this category are included in the sample. Further information is available upon request. 
15
 We also use an extended version of the model including a proxy for interest rate risk. For the majority of financial 
institutions in our sample the interest rate coefficient is statistically insignificant. Estimates and significance are 
largely unaffected under the extended model. 
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Thomson Datastream for periods of 251 trading days before and 250 trading days after each 
M&A announcement.  
3.2. Determinants of Risk 
Our next step is to examine the relationship between diversification and bank risk. To achieve 
this, we estimate equation [4] within a cross-sectional framework to assess the determinants of 
risk measures in the pre- and post-announcement periods. We build upon the risk decomposition 
results and employ total, systematic, and idiosyncratic risks as dependent variables:  
 �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଶ��ℎ,௜ + ߚଷܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚସ�ܧ�௜ + ߚହܵ��݁௜ + �� ,           [4] 
where, 
,j iY  is a market-based measure of risk j (systematic risk, measured by the market beta, β, 
idiosyncratic risk, 2i , or total risk, σ2Ri) for company i. 
A combination of theory and empirical evidence influences our choice of risk determinants. 
We proxy diversification (DIV) using the percentage of non-interest income-to-total operating 
income (Baele et al., 2007). We also use the percentage of loans-to-assets as an alternative proxy 
for diversification. However, one may argue these measures are limited because they could be 
highly correlated with loan-related risk. For robustness, we also construct a Herfindahl-type 
index of diversification (see, Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Berger et al, 2010a) and re-estimate all 
models using this. In addition, we test for a non-linear relationship between non-interest income 
and risk by introducing the squared non-interest income share term in the regressions.16 Section 2 
noted that the empirical literature does not yield a precise expectation of the sign of the 
relationship between diversification and risk. LL is proxy for loan-related risk (Acharya et al., 
2006; Berger et al., 2010b). We measure loan risk through three indicators: the percentage of 
non-performing loans-to-total assets; the percentage of loan loss provisions-to-total assets; and 
the percentage of loan losses-to-total assets. We expect a positive sign on the coefficient of LL 
with respect to idiosyncratic risk to signal that firms are bearing an increasing exposure to firm-
level risk. ROA, LEV and Size are control variables capturing profitability (return on assets; ratio 
of net income-to-assets), leverage (ratio of total assets-to-common equity), and size (natural 
                                                 
16
 See Section 4.2.1for details.  
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logarithm of total assets). Finally, ��, is the error term with the usual properties.17 We source 
balance sheet, income statement and deal-specific data from Thomson One Banker, and lag all 
independent variables one year with respect to risk measures to mitigate possible endogeneity.18 
As a robustness test, we re-estimate the models using the completion date for each deal 
instead of the announcement date. We also re-estimate the models for pre- and post-
announcement periods within a single equation by employing an interaction binary variable; DB, 
is equal to one before an announcement and zero otherwise.  In both cases the results remain 
quantitatively similar (available upon request from the authors). 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1. Risk Decomposition: Univariate analysis 
This section gauges the impact of M&A announcements on the risk profiles of acquiring 
banks and identifies the shifts in total, systematic and idiosyncratic risks between pre- and post-
announcement periods. In what follows, we present the results from the three types of 
combinations and discuss any possible variations in risk adjustments before and after the 
announcement of deals (Section 4.1.1). Subsequently, we present the results from different 
subsamples (Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3). 
4.1.1. Full Sample 
Table 2 reports the results of the risk decomposition exercise for each type of deal. We 
present results for the full sample (1991-2012) and for deals pre- and post- 2007. Panels A and B 
decompose total risk into pre- and post- deal announcement periods. Panel C reports changes in 
the variables between the two periods. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
First, we analyse Bank-Insure deals (columns two to four). The full sample results show that 
the mean market beta (ߚ) significantly increases from 0.846 to 0.901 (by 6.52%, see Panel C). 
The increase in beta accords with expectations: as both market concentration and average firm 
                                                 
17
 To conserve space, we only report the results for one DIV indicator (non-interest income-to-total operating 
income) and one LL indicator (loan loss provisions-to-total-assets). The results using alternative proxies are 
qualitatively similar and are discussed in the paper (detailed tables are available upon request; similarly for the total 
risk regressions). 
18
 Specifically, we source balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each 
announcement.  
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size increase due to M&A, the equities of these larger firms will tend to approach the total 
market basket; therefore, betas move closer to one. The literature documents that large and 
diversified banks holding relatively high shares of non-interest income, exhibit systematically 
higher market betas, implying that they bear higher systematic risk (Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; 
Baele et al., 2007; Stiroh, 2006). Shifting focus to the sources of risk, total return risk (�ோ�ଶ ) in the 
pre-announcement period is 4.423; systematic and idiosyncratic risk account for 34.79% and 
65.21% of total risk, respectively. The effect of M&A announcements triggers an increase in 
total risk to 4.773 (by 7.90%). However, the increases in systematic (ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ ) and idiosyncratic 
risks are statistically insignificant. Turning to deals before and after 2007 (columns three and 
four), those that occurred pre-2007 did not produce any significant changes in risk for acquiring 
banks. In contrast, we find significant increases in beta, systematic and idiosyncratic risks at 
acquiring banks post-2007. 
Shifting focus to Bank-Agency combinations in the full period (columns five to seven) the 
mean market beta significantly increases after deals from 0.618 to 0.726 (by 17.54%, see Panel 
C). The increase accords with claims that larger and more diversified banks exhibit 
systematically higher betas. Although combining insurance agencies raises acquiring banks’ total 
and systematic risks, whilst reducing idiosyncratic risk, the changes are insignificant.19 
For Bank-Securities combinations (columns eight to ten) we note an insignificant increase in 
the mean market beta from 0.979 to 1.018 following announcements. However, and in terms of 
total risk, banks bidding for securities firms experience a significant increase of 38.45% (Panel 
C), which is driven by significant post-announcement increases in systematic (by 59.68%) and 
idiosyncratic risks (by 24.18%). Comparing separately the pre- and post-2007 periods reveals a 
complementary set of results for each type of combination. Before the crisis, deals did not 
significantly affect total risk or systematic risk irrespective of whether banks were combining 
with either insurance or securities firms. However, the post-2007 results demonstrate an 
unambiguous shift in the risks of acquiring banks as we find significant increases in systematic 
and idiosyncratic risks for bank-insure and bank-securities combinations.  
Overall, the full period results show that bank betas increase significantly for both types of 
insurance combinations though not for bank combinations with securities firms. However, we 
                                                 
19
 Note that we do not offer a discussion of the pre- and post-2007 results given that only one deal in this sample 
occurs after 2007. 
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find a significant increase in total risk for Bank-Securities whereas the observed increase for 
bank and insurance combinations is insignificant. Before the crisis, bank combinations with 
insurance companies and insurance agencies was risk-reducing (albeit, insignificantly), whereas 
bank combinations with securities firms significantly lowered idiosyncratic risk. Post-2007, we 
note the magnitude of the increases in total risk for all combinations, albeit significant only for 
bank-securities. The results partially accord with Boyd et al. (1993) and Lown et al. (2000) who 
suggest that bank combinations with insurance firms are superior to combinations with securities 
firms in terms of impacting risk. One interpretation of the variation in results if we consider 
separately the pre- and post-2007 deals is that the crisis might have altered market perceptions on 
bank diversification (Elyasiani et al., 2014). 
Another plausible explanation for the variation in results across combinations could be that 
acquiring banks self-select the type of combination they desire, which might reflect fundamental 
differences in terms of their pre-announcement degree of diversification, risk or size.  
Table 3 shows summary statistics and t-statistics for tests of the difference of means across 
combination pairs. Panel A confirms the existence of some differences in the pre-announcement 
profiles of acquiring banks. The average bank that acquires a securities firm is significantly 
larger, and more highly levered and diversified than either insurance combination, hence their 
higher beta and lower idiosyncratic risk exposure. Focusing on the two types of insurance 
targets, on average, banks which acquire insurance companies in comparison to insurance 
agencies tend to be significantly larger, more highly levered and diversified, and achieving better 
asset quality. That the average bank in Bank-Agency is smaller and less diversified explains their 
high idiosyncratic risk and lower beta.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The post-announcement statistics suggest that banks in each subset are becoming more alike. In 
particular, the pre-announcement variation in total and systematic risk fades away. Although the 
average bank betas remain statistically different across combinations in the post-announcement 
period, their absolute values are converging. This is expected given that we also observe some 
degree of post-announcement convergence in their degree of diversification and size. 
4.1.2. Pre-announcement bank characteristics 
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The above results indicate the effect of deal announcements on the average risk of banks in 
each subset. Each combination contains banks located in different geographical areas and/or 
banks with distinct accounting profiles. Previously, we noted that low-risk and large European 
banks experience an increase in default risk after merger announcements (Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2011). Therefore, we determine if the post-announcement changes in risk vary 
according to pre-announcement characteristics of acquiring banks. To investigate this possibility 
we split the banks in each subset by their pre-announcement levels of diversification (Table 4, 
Panel A, non-interest income share), risk (Panel B, total risk (�ோ�ଶ )) and size (Panel C, natural 
logarithm of total assets); second we segment the sample into US and EU deals (Table 5). 
[INSERT TABLES 4 & 5 HERE] 
We begin by examining the effects of the degree of prior diversification (Table 4, Panel A). 
For each type of combination, we note the absence of any significant differences in risk changes 
between high- and low-diversification banks. The lack of variation in risk profiles suggests that 
the pre-announcement diversification level is unimportant. However, for low-diversification 
Bank-Agency and Bank-Securities partnerships we observe significant increases in systematic 
risk following announcements. Whereas the increase in systematic risk is offset by a significant 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk for Bank-Agency partnerships, it drives a significant increase in 
total risk for Bank-Securities partnerships. All high-diversification banks realise a significant 
increase in beta following announcements.  
Next, we consider the effects of the degree of pre-announcement risk (Table 4, Panel B). 
Again we fail to uncover evidence supporting the proposition that initial differences in risk at 
acquiring banks affects developments in risk profiles. The risk components of high-risk banks 
bidding for insurance companies and agencies remain largely unaffected following deals. On the 
contrary, low-risk banks in these subsets exhibit significant increases across risk components 
(except systematic risk for Bank-Agency). Pre-announcement risk is largely irrelevant for the 
Bank-Securities subset although both high- and low-risk banks show an increase in systematic 
risk. Nonetheless, and in contrast with Vallascas and Hagendorff (2011), tests show pre-
announcement risk does not realise significant differences among high- and low-risk subsets. 
In Panel C we examine if post-announcement risk varies with pre-announcement size. For 
Bank-Insure, small banks experience significant changes in systematic risk and beta. On the 
contrary, large banks experience changes in risk for Bank-Securities. Lastly, pre-announcement 
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size is irrelevant for Bank-Agency as beta increases for small and large banks. Further tests on 
the differences in risk changes across high- and low-sized banks (except Bank-Agency) 
corroborate the results – the changes in risk between the high- and low-sized banks are 
statistically different for both Bank-Insure (beta) and Bank-Securities (systematic risk). 
The international nature of our sample lets us test if bank geography is driving the results on 
risk. Table 5 decomposes risks for combinations occurring in the US and the EU.20 For Bank-
Insure deals, US banks experience significant increases in systematic risk and beta following 
announcements whereas the risk profile of EU banks is unaffected. Beta significantly increases 
for US and EU banks that bid for insurance agencies following deals. However, we note the 
magnitude of increase in total risk for Bank-Securities deals that is significant for US banks and 
driven by larger idiosyncratic risk. In contrast, higher systematic risk drives the (albeit 
insignificant) increase in total risk for EU banks. The observed cross-border differences may be 
due to the fact that US banks bidding for insurers are smaller in size than their EU peers and, 
consistent with our results on size, exhibit higher betas in the post-announcement period. 
Thus far, our analysis considers the risk effects of different combinations as well as the timing 
of deals, pre-announcement characteristics, and bank geography. Nonetheless, the univariate 
results may not fully capture the drivers of risk changes. To shed more light on our findings, we 
report on risk determinants, before and after announcements, from a multivariate setting. 
4.2. Determinants of Risk: Cross-section analysis 
Equation [4] models the relationships between risks and indicators of diversification, loan 
risk, profitability, leverage and size within a cross-sectional framework. As risk is sensitive to 
the nature of the operations of target institutions, we estimate separate equations for each 
combination before and after deal announcements. Table 6 reports the results from separate 
estimations of equation [4] when market beta (Panel A) and idiosyncratic risk (Panel B) are the 
dependent variable. 
4.2.1. Type of deal 
We first consider the results pertaining to market betas. For the pre-announcement period we 
find a highly significant, positive relationship between beta and diversification (the proxy is non-
                                                 
20
 We elect not to report results for the remaining countries in our sample because the high degree of heterogeneity 
across bidder countries outside of the US and EU makes comparisons problematic. 
18 
 
interest income share) which holds for each deal type. In effect, banks that rely more on non-
interest sources of income face higher exposure to market-wide shocks, and consequently realize 
higher market betas. Our finding complements Baele et al. (2007) who report similar results in 
the context of bank diversification (though not within the context of bank-nonbank mergers), and 
Allen and Jagtiani (2000) who find nonbank activities increase bank systematic risk. Firm size 
exerts a significant effect on beta for all combinations, which accords with expectations that 
larger firms tend to capture a greater share in the total market basket, and hence, realize 
systematically higher betas. Whereas leverage is positively associated with beta for Bank-Insure, 
supporting claims that riskier firms (with high leverage) tend to have systematically higher betas 
than unlevered firms,21 the result does not hold for other combinations. This confirms our 
previous observation that banks in each subset exhibit fundamental differences across many 
dimensions. 
 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Post-announcement, the significant relationship between beta and diversification dissipates 
for combinations involving insurance firms, though retaining significance for Bank-Securities 
deals. A plausible explanation for this finding could be that insurance activities bring about the 
desired diversification effects. Specifically, it is possible that the additional non-interest income 
accruing from insurance activities helps to lower systematic risks and the insignificant 
relationships we observe post announcement simply reflect this. In contrast, additional non-
interest income from securities business may not yield diversification benefits. This outcome 
also sheds additional light on the full period results in Section 4.1, where we find that beta 
increases post announcement for Bank-Insure and Bank-Agency. We suspect this increase in risk 
does not relate to a higher non-interest income share arising from insurance activities per se, but 
relates to other factors like bigger size; in support of this argument we note the positive and 
significant post-announcement size coefficients.  
In contrast to pre-announcement, and for insurance combinations only, the coefficient on the 
asset quality indicator (loan loss provisions ratio) turns significant. This indicator can be 
interpreted as an ex-ante measure of the actual losses from lending activities (Berger et al., 
2010b). However, provisioning can be used to smooth earnings across accounting years; 
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 Baele et al. (2007) draw similar conclusions. They find an inverse relationship between beta and the capital-to-
assets ratio and contend that a higher degree of capital adequacy lowers systematic risk. 
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therefore, the market interpretation of its magnitude could depend on firm-specific and 
macroeconomic conditions. We note a significant yet inverse relationship between profitability 
(ROA) and beta for Bank-Insure. One explanation lies in the relationship between ROA and 
leverage: holding ROE (return on equity) constant, the higher the leverage, the lower the ROA 
and vice-versa. Therefore, a negative relationship between ROA and beta can be explained if 
lower ROA stemming from higher leverage leads to higher risk exposure, and as noted, higher 
systematic risk. 
Panel B shows the results from the idiosyncratic risk regressions. Pre-announcement, we 
observe a significant inverse relationship between idiosyncratic risk and diversification for each 
type of bank-insurance combination, which holds only for Bank-Agency post-announcement. 
This is consistent with claims that, although income diversification is expected to reduce 
idiosyncratic risk, an overreliance on non-interest income can produce an opposing effect (Baele 
et al., 2007; Stiroh, 2006). To contextualize this argument, as noted before, banks that bid for 
insurance underwriters are more diversified than banks bidding for insurance agents, hence the 
variation in the results. An alternative explanation might be that the additional income from 
insurance brokerage plays an important role in reducing exposure to idiosyncratic risk. This is 
consistent with arguments elsewhere like Nurullah and Staikouras (2008), suggesting that 
insurance brokerage does not significantly affect the risk of banking firms. Furthermore, the 
significant, negative coefficient on size verifies the presence of size-related decreases in 
idiosyncratic risk, and corroborates previous findings; for instance, Baele et al. (2007) and Stiroh 
(2006). The insignificant result for Bank-Securities confirms our earlier result on beta and 
supports the notion that securities business is more systematic in nature.  
The negative and significant size coefficients before and after deals for Bank-Insure and 
Bank-Agency complies with expectations of too-big-to-fail guarantees, and/or scale related 
synergies. Delis and Staikouras (2011) report a negative relationship between bank size and risk, 
which corroborates our result.22 Another plausible explanation obtains from Wilson and 
Williams (2000). They find smaller EU banks experience more variable growth than larger banks 
and suggest the latter can exploit diversification advantages through off-balance sheet activities, 
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 Delis and Staikouras (2011) measure bank risk using the Z-score (higher values indicating lower risk) and report a 
positive relationship between risk and bank size. They suggest large banks are more profitable and, hence, less risky, 
because of economies of scale and/or market power. 
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enabling them to smooth fluctuations in growth. This might explain the estimated sign for size, 
since banks that exhibit less volatile growth patterns should bear less idiosyncratic risk.  
In unreported regressions, we re-estimate equation [4] using two alternative proxies for the 
level of diversification. First, we replace the non-interest income share ratio with a Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HH) type index of diversification (see Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Second, we 
employ the loans ratio which we measure as the ratio of loans-to-assets. The coefficients on HH 
confirm the earlier results for non-interest income share which is unsurprising given both 
measures derive from bank income statements. We construct the loans ratio using balance sheet 
information. The findings indicate loan-intensity is associated with systematically lower betas for 
Bank-Insure and Bank-Securities although significance varies across periods. For Bank-Agency 
deals, we observe a significant, positive relationship with beta in each period. In contrast, a lack 
of significance generally characterises the relationship between the loans ratio and idiosyncratic 
risk.23 The exception is Bank-Agency for which market perceptions shift and the coefficient 
turns significant in post-announcement. In effect, the additional risk element which might stem 
from raising loan intensity is not being priced by the market, perhaps due to the fact that 
investors expect that credit risk is offset by diversification into insurance brokerage. This result 
partially contrasts Barros et al. (2007) who report that bigger and more diversified EU 
commercial banks are less likely to perform well and more likely to perform poorly, as opposed 
to small and loan-intensive banks. For robustness, we also test for the presence of a non-linear 
relationship between the risk factors and diversification by adding the squared term of non-
interest income share in the regression equations. The quadratic non-interest share coefficient 
remains insignificant across specifications, while our existing results remain consistent.24   
4.2.2. Bank characteristics and risk 
Section 4.1 highlights some variations in the univariate results across subsamples. Therefore, 
we conduct a number of tests to evaluate if bank characteristics, such as, pre-announcement 
levels of bank diversification, (total) risk and size are important determinants of pre- and post-
announcement risk estimates, while controlling for other factors. To achieve this, we augment 
Equation [4] with three intercept dummy variables to account for high and low pre-
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 See footnote 16. 
24
 Details of the model and the coefficient estimates are available upon request. 
21 
 
announcement levels of diversification (DD), risk (DR) and size (DS), respectively.25 Table 7 
presents results for the augmented model when the dependent variable is beta (Panel A) and 
idiosyncratic risk (Panel B). 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Generally, the level of diversification does not impact beta or the idiosyncratic risk of 
acquiring banks in the pre-announcement period (bar the single exception for Bank-Insure for 
idiosyncratic risk). The coefficients on DD demonstrate that highly diversified banks which 
acquire insurance agencies and securities firms experience systematically higher betas than low 
diversification banks post announcement.  This corroborates our previous findings (see Table 4); 
however, after controlling for other factors, the addition of insurance underwriting to highly 
diversified banks does not affect beta, and the significant relationship with idiosyncratic risk 
dissipates post-announcement.  
The pre-announcement level of (total) risk does not exert a causal effect on beta in the periods 
before and after announcements and across combinations. In contrast, high-risk banks exhibit 
significantly higher levels of idiosyncratic risk, relative to low-risk banks, both before and after 
announcements and for all combinations, controlling for other factors.  
We find that bigger banks which acquire both types of insurance firm realise significantly 
lower betas in the pre-announcement period only. Thus, the acquisition of insurance business 
erodes the observed pre-announcement benefits of larger size. For bigger banks participating in 
Bank-Insure deals the result on beta is offset by a significant pre-announcement increase in 
idiosyncratic risk. Aside from this solitary finding, the relationship between firm size and 
idiosyncratic risk is insignificant. Finally, the results on the other coefficients are qualitatively 
similar to our main findings (see Table 5). 
4.2.3. Bank characteristics, covariates and risk 
DeYoung et al. (2009) document that bank size is a central aspect of mergers and acquisitions. 
Size confers, among other things, management quality, market power, political influence, the 
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 The dummy variables equal one if banks register a high (above the median) pre-announcement level for each 
measure and zero otherwise. Additionally, we employ an expanded specification to control for any effects which 
could be driven by the geographical characteristics of deals. The augmented model specifies a cross-border dummy 
equal to one for cross-border deals and zero otherwise, and a US-bidder dummy variable equal to one when the 
bidder is located in the US and zero otherwise. Their coefficients are insignificant in all cases. Detailed results are 
available upon request. 
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extent of access to safety net provisions, as well as established relations with profitability, 
efficiency and risk. In the context of the present analysis, the relationships between firm-specific 
performance indicators and risk factors might vary with bank size for different factors. For 
instance, one could reasonably expect to observe differences in the composition of balance sheets 
between large and small banks both before and after the completion of deals. Larger banks are 
more likely to generate a higher proportion of total operating income from non-traditional 
sources of earnings, as well as exhibiting differences in loan portfolio composition, leverage and 
profitability. Similarly, the relationship between aspects of firm performance and risk could also 
vary according to the levels of bank risk and/or degree of bank diversification.  
In order to control for any possible effects arising from the pre-announcement levels of size, 
risk and diversification, we augment equation [4] as follows. In separate re-estimations of the 
determinants of risk, the binary indicators of (a) large and small (DS); (b) high-and low-risk 
(DR); and (c) high- and low-diversification (DD) are interacted with each covariate. Tables 8 to 
10 show the results using the interactions for size, risk, and diversification.  
Table 8 shows the effect of pre-announcement bank size on relationships with beta and 
idiosyncratic risk. The coefficient on non-interest income share in the augmented regression 
indicates the relationship between (the pre-announcement level of) diversification and risk for 
small banks. For small banks that acquire either type of insurance company, we observe a 
positive and significant relationship with beta and an inverse relationship with idiosyncratic risk 
before deals. For small banks, the significant relation between diversification and beta is robust 
for Bank-Agency deals. We observe a positive relationship between diversification and both beta 
and idiosyncratic risk for small banks that acquire securities firms, though significance dissipates 
after completion. We find significant differences in the effect on risks arising from differences in 
the pre-announcement levels of diversification between large and small banks. For large banks, 
diversification lowers beta both before and after Bank-Agency deals. In Bank-Insure deals 
diversification increases (lowers) beta (idiosyncratic) risk for large banks relative to small banks 
in the pre- (post) announcement period. For Bank-Securities deals, diversification yields both 
types of risk benefits albeit only in the pre-announcement period.  
Table 9 shows the results conditioned on the pre-announcement level of bank risk. For low-
risk banks, diversification is positively associated with higher beta in Bank-Agency and Bank-
Securities deals pre-announcement. The impact of diversification is significantly different 
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between high-risk and low-risk banks in Bank-Securities deals in the pre-announcement period. 
In contrast, for low-risk banks we find an inverse relationship between diversification and 
idiosyncratic risk for Bank-Agency deals both before and after deals. In the case of Bank-Insure 
combinations, diversification produces idiosyncratic risk-reducing effects for both low-risk and 
high-risk banks. The augmented results conform to our earlier findings (see Table 6).  
[INSERT TABLES 8, 9 & 10 HERE] 
Finally, Table 10 shows the results when the conditioning factor is the pre-announcement level 
of bank diversification. Non-interest income share registers insignificant relationships with betas 
across each subset and period (bar Bank-Agency pre-announcement). The idiosyncratic risk 
regressions infer that low-diversification banks bidding for insurance agencies achieve non-
interest income share-related diversification benefits following deals. Yet, the benefits in terms 
of lowering idiosyncratic risk exposure for high-diversification banks is significantly less than 
the benefits accruing to low-diversification banks. 
5. Conclusions 
This article examines the risk profile of international banks after acquiring insurance 
companies and securities firms. The results can inform the debate on bank diversification versus 
functional separation. Important questions relate to whether the benefits of bank diversification 
into non-banking outweigh the costs; if the type of combination realises a differential effect; and 
if size matters. The benefits include potential diversification gains and cross-selling 
opportunities, which can help to maximize profits by realizing new revenue streams. A possible 
downside is formerly segmented businesses now face common shocks, which raises systematic 
(and total) risk.  
The academic literature offers inconclusive evidence on the risks associated with financial 
conglomeration and to risks arising from bank and nonbank combinations. To address this we 
decompose risk to determine the direct effects of bank mergers with insurance companies and 
securities firms on the total, systematic and idiosyncratic risks of acquiring institutions. Our 
analysis extends previous work on bank mergers as follows. First, we construct a large sample of 
deals over an extended time period including the 2007-09 crisis. Hence, we investigate if the 
crisis precipitated perceived changes in risks after bank mergers. Second, since risk appears 
sensitive to the business operations of target institutions, we provide separate results for bank 
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mergers with insurance underwriters, insurance agencies, and securities firms. Previous studies 
on M&A and risk aggregate diversifying mergers thereby failing to control for target type which 
potentially biases results. Furthermore, we examine if the effects on risk vary with the pre-
announcement size, levels of diversification, risk and geography of acquiring banks. Our 
findings link market measures of risk and accounting measures of diversification, loan risk, 
profitability, leverage and size. We test for shifts in these relationships after deal announcements 
to determine if diversification yields a comparative advantage in terms of risk conditioned by the 
type of target. Thus, we offer new insights on bank diversification into non-banking, with results 
that apply to all stakeholders. 
Our results are summarized as follows. We find that bank acquisitions of securities businesses 
increases total risk through higher levels of systematic and idiosyncratic risks. In contrast, bank 
acquisitions of insurers (underwriters and agents) realise an increase in betas. On the basis that 
risk increases after deals announced between 2007 and 2012, we suggest the crisis has made 
markets wary of bank diversification. Our evidence demonstrates fundamental differences across 
the risk profiles of acquiring banks, which infers banks self-select to diversify into particular 
nonbank activities. Nevertheless, our evidence shows banks become more alike after deals. 
Indeed, we fail to uncover evidence in support of the proposition that highly diversified or risky 
banks experience different post-announcement effects compared with less diversified/risky peers 
in the same subset of deals. We do find, however, that the changes in risk between the high- and 
low-sized banks are statistically different for Bank-Insure (beta) and Bank-Securities (systematic 
risk). 
The cross section results unambiguously show size exerts a significant effect across periods 
and subsets. We contend the increased risk in both types of bank-insurance combination relates 
not to diversification in the form of a larger non-interest income share arising from insurance 
activities per se, but emanates from other factors like absolute size. The results offer interesting 
insights into the effects of bank pre-announcement characteristics such as size, levels of 
diversification and risk on the relationships between covariates and risk. 
Our empirical evidence offers some interesting conclusions that can inform the debate on 
bank diversification into non-banking. First, ongoing and future reforms should distinguish the 
types of bank diversification. The fact that bank combinations with securities firms increases risk 
augurs in support of the US and European decision to legislate for the functional separation of 
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banks. In comparison, bank combinations with insurance companies would appear to pose fewer 
risks to universal style banks. Second, the characteristics of diversifying banks should also be 
considered. Although the choice of target activity may reflect the strategic goals of acquiring 
banks and may lead to desirable combinations from the perspective of participating banks, 
policymakers should carefully monitor the effects of these deals on banks’ risk profiles. This is 
especially important given the positive relationship between systematic risk, default probabilities 
and systemic risk (Tarashev et al., 2010), coupled with our observation that banks across 
combinations become more similar following deals. Third, the importance of bank size as the 
primary contributor to systematic risk should be acknowledged. The presence of a significant 
size effect supports arguments that large banks should be subject to greater regulatory scrutiny, 
for instance, in the form of enhanced risk-based capital, leverage and liquidity requirements, 
contingent capital requirements, resolution plans and greater public disclosure of information 
(Krainer, 2012). Narrowing the scope of bank activities without imposing limits on size might 
lead to significant side effects. Such an effect might be that reforms will not only introduce costs 
to financial institutions, the taxpayer and the consumer, but will produce renewed imbalances 
among financial institutions. History shows large conglomerates employ their political clout to 
weaken regulatory discipline and circumvent restrictions on activities (Carow and Kane, 2002), 
should they find themselves at a competitive disadvantage to their peers. As such, entering 
another series of regulatory dialectic (see Kane, 2000) does not represent an optimal solution to 
the problem. In fact, it raises the probability that large banks could seek to benefit from their 
market position including taking advantage of safety net provisions. Fourth, regulators should be 
aware of the risks on the safety net imposed by the post-merger introduction of nonbanks to the 
banking group. It remains to be seen how effective the principles of subsidiarisation and ring-
fencing will be in this regard. Taken together, combining the size factor, regulatory arbitrage, 
subsidization of non-bank affiliates via the bank safety net and affiliation risk (Herring and 
Santomero, 1990; Flannery, 1999) represents a potentially thorny issue for both policy makers 
and regulators. 
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Table 1: Sample distribution of bidders and targets by country and deal type 
 
Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
Region/Country Bidders Targets Bidders Targets Bidders Targets 
       
Europe (ex. UK) 42 40 4 3 23 16 
United Kingdom 7 5 0 0 3 3 
United States 47 50 89 90 10 13 
Canada 9 6 0 0 1 0 
Asia 11 13 0 0 14 19 
Australia 6 5 0 0 1 2 
South America 2 4 0 0 2 1 
Africa 1 2 0 0 0 0 
       
Total 125 125 93 93 54 54 
The table presents the distribution of the sample of bidders and targets by country and by deal type. The sample consists of available 
international data collected for 272 publicly announced deals between 1991 and 2012. Information on deals is obtained by Thomson One 
Banker. The sample of Bank-Insure announcements consists of deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance company. The 
sample of Bank-Agency announcements consists of deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance agency/broker. The sample 
of Bank-Securities announcements consists of deals where the bidder is a bank and the target a securities/commodities broker. 
 
 
Figure 1: Composition of sample of deals by year and deal type 
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Table 2. Decomposition of total return risk of acquiring banks 
 
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
    
 All Pre-07 Post-07 All Pre-07 Post-07 All Pre-2007 Post-07 
 N=125 N=103 N=22 N=93 N=92 N=1 N=54 N=37 N=17 
          Panel A: period before announcement (day -250 to day -1) �ோ�ଶ  4.423 3.913 7.084 3.873 3.829 7.923 3.365 2.955 4.257 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  1.539 1.307 2.748 0.666 0.655 1.699 1.352 0.956 2.216 
 (34.79%) (33.40%) (38.80%) (17.20%) (17.10%) (21.44%) (40.19%) (32.34%) (52.04%) ���ଶ  2.884 2.606 4.336 3.207 3.174 6.225 2.013 2.000 2.042 
 (65.21%) (66.60%) (61.20%) (82.80%) (82.90%) (78.56%) (59.81%) (67.66%) (47.96%) ߚ 0.846 0.812 1.023 0.618 0.611 1.290 0.979 0.930 1.084 �� 0.407 0.415 0.317 0.810 0.813 - 0.307 0.337 0.202 �ோ�ଶ  1.799 1.587 2.904 1.506 1.511 1.021 1.335 1.070 1.912 
Panel B: period after announcement (day +1 to day +250) �ோ�ଶ  4.773 3.774 9.977 4.003 3.760 26.032 4.659 3.127 7.994 
 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  1.721 1.233 4.265 0.868 0.756 11.039 2.159 1.211 4.223 
 (36.06%) (32.66%) (42.75%) (21.69%) (20.11%) (42.41%) (46.35%) (38.74%) (52.83%) ���ଶ  3.052 2.541 5.712 3.134 3.004 14.993 2.500 1.916 3.711 
 (63.94%) (67.34%) (57.25%) (78.31%) (79.89%) (57.59%) (53.65%) (61.26%) (47.17%) ߚ 0.901 0.852 1.156 0.726 0.720 1.282 1.018 0.976 1.111 �� 0.379 0.365 0.350 1.008 0.844 - 0.363 0.371 0.338 �ோ�ଶ  1.943 1.646 3.492 1.419 1.360 6.718 1.762 1.044 3.326 
Panel C: Changes in risk post-announcement1 ∆�ோ�ଶ  0.349 -0.139 2.893 0.129 -0.069 18.109 1.294b 0.172 3.736b 
% change 7.90% -3.55% 40.84% 3.33% -1.79% 228.56% 38.45% 5.81% 87.76% ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.182 -0.074 1.517c 0.202 0.102 9.341 0.807b 0.255 2.007b 
% change 11.82% -5.68% 55.20% 30.31% 15.50% 549.90% 59.68% 26.73% 90.61% ∆���ଶ  0.167 -0.065 1.376a -0.073 -0.170 8.768 0.487a -0.084a 1.729 
% change 5.81% -2.48% 31.74% -2.27% -5.36% 140.86% 24.18% -4.20% 84.68% ∆ߚ 0.055c 0.040 0.133c 0.108a 0.110a -0.008 0.040 0.045 0.027 
% change 6.52% 4.94% 13.04% 17.54% 17.96% -0.63% 4.04% 4.87% 2.50% ∆�ோ�ଶ  0.145 0.060 0.588 -0.087 -0.151 5.698 0.427c -0.026 1.414 
% change 8.04% 3.75% 20.26% -5.80% -9.98% 558.21% 32.00% -2.42% 73.92% 
Panel D: Difference in risk changes between Pre-07 and Post-07 deals     ∆�ଶܴ௜  -(1.49)  -  -(2.30)b ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ   -(1.83)c  -  -(1.96)c ∆���ଶ   -(1.07)  -  -(2.13)b ∆ߚ  (1.16)  -  (0.23) 
The Table presents the shift in relative importance of risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before and after 
Bank-Insure partnership announcements. We cover 218 bank-insurance and 54 bank-securities deal announcements between 
1991 and 2012. The first column identifies the risk measures and statistics; each subsequent column shows the results from 
subsets of the sample. “Bank-Insure” includes cases when banks bid for insurance companies; “Bank-Agency” includes 
cases when banks bid for insurance agencies/brokers; “Bank-Securities” presents cases when banks bid for securities firms 
or commodities brokers. “All” includes the full sample results, while “Pre-07” and “Post-07” present the results for the pre- 
and post-2007 deals. Panels A and B present results from the pre- and post-announcement periods, whilst Panel C shows 
differences in the risk measures before and after M&A announcements. Panel D evaluates if the risk changes of the 
respective pairs of subsets (Pre-07 – Post-07) are equal (t-stats in brackets) We calculate the risk measures using equations 
[1] and [2]. Variance terms are multiplied by 104. σ2Ri is total risk, β2σ2Rm is the systematic risk component, σ2εi is the 
idiosyncratic risk component. All risk measures are averaged across firms. β is the average beta, while σβ the standard 
deviation of betas. σ2Rm is the average variance of market returns. The numbers in parentheses in Panels A and B show the 
contribution of the pertinent risk component to total risk. Δs in Panel C represent changes in the variables.  
1A negative value indicates a reduction in risk or other measures, while positive values indicate an increase.  a/b/c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
     
 
      
 
1. Bank-Insure 2. Bank-Agency 3. Bank-Securities ∆Mean (1 - 2) ∆Mean (1 - 3) ∆Mean (2 - 3) 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. t-stat t-stat t-stat 
 
            Panel A: Period before announcement (day -250 to day  -1)          
 
          �ோ�ଶ  4.423 3.324 3.154 3.873 2.976 4.079 3.365 2.473 2.877 (1.10) (2.17)b (0.87) ߚ 0.846 0.850 0.407 0.618 0.622 0.413 0.979 1.044 0.307 (3.99)a -(2.36)b -(6.00)a ���ଶ  2.884 2.305 2.222 3.207 2.166 3.974 2.013 1.688 2.083 -(0.69) (5.36)a (4.03)a 
Non-interest income share 0.217 0.189 0.123 0.174 0.162 0.084 0.294 0.279 0.141 (2.96)a -(3.51)a -(5.78)a 
Diversification (HH index) 0.331 0.323 0.119 0.279 0.286 0.096 0.421 0.453 0.100 (3.41)a -(5.26)a -(8.48)a 
Loans ratio 0.629 0.652 0.142 0.637 0.638 0.090 0.507 0.534 0.198 -(0.47) (4.32)a (4.75)a 
Non-performing loans ratio 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.003 0.012 (5.31)a -(0.19) -(2.92)a 
Loan loss provision ratio 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 (3.18)a (1.54) -(0.95) 
Loan loss ratio 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.008 (2.74)a (0.02) -(1.50) 
ROA 1.357 1.247 1.099 1.543 1.546 0.413 1.109 0.790 0.967 (1.64) (1.50) (3.20)a 
Firm Size 24.271 24.606 2.219 22.253 22.094 1.764 26.542 26.553 1.824 (7.29)a -(7.17)a -(13.99)a 
Leverage 17.177 14.776 8.457 12.518 12.120 4.647 21.089 18.196 12.904 (4.95)a -(2.09)b -(4.85)a 
             Panel B: Period after announcement (day +1 to day  +250)          
 
          �ோ�ଶ  4.773 3.274 4.964 4.003 3.027 3.528 4.659 2.834 4.744 (1.31) (0.14) -(0.88) ߚ 0.901 0.920 0.379 0.726 0.713 0.499 1.018 1.094 0.363 (2.78)a -(1.93)c -(4.07)a ���ଶ  3.052 2.085 3.640 3.134 2.074 2.874 2.500 1.675 2.614 -(0.18) (1.13) (1.36) 
Non-interest income share 0.248 0.239 0.118 0.218 0.201 0.102 0.304 0.277 0.178 (1.83)c -(2.16)b -(3.29)a 
Diversification (HH index) 0.354 0.383 0.121 0.327 0.328 0.087 0.421 0.449 0.089 (1.78)c -(4.18)a -(6.34)a 
Loans ratio 0.635 0.647 0.125 0.643 0.645 0.115 0.475 0.501 0.207 -(0.45) (5.32)a (5.56)a 
Non-performing loans ratio 0.011 0.006 0.015 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.014 0.006 0.019 (4.21)a -(0.86) -(2.84)a 
Loan loss provision ratio 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.005 (2.48)b -(0.28) -(1.80)c 
Loan loss ratio 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.007 (2.85)a (0.38) -(1.07) 
ROA 1.224 1.254 0.693 1.415 1.552 0.625 0.794 0.607 1.405 -(1.93)c (2.15)b (3.10)a 
Firm Size 24.469 24.711 2.263 22.501 22.275 1.784 26.625 26.585 2.081 (6.79)a -(6.16)a -(12.22)a 
Leverage 17.040 14.477 8.796 12.454 11.707 5.493 20.606 16.679 13.861 (4.39)a -(1.76)c -(4.22)a 
             
The Table reports summary statistics for measures of risk, accounting data and other characteristics of banks bidding for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), insurance agents/brokers (Bank-
Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. We calculate the risk measures using equations [1] and [2]. σ2Ri is total risk, β is the market 
beta and σ2εi is the idiosyncratic risk component. Variance terms are multiplied by 104. Non-interest income share (percentage of non-interest income-to-total operating income), Diversification 
(HH index capturing the degree of diversification in bank net operating revenue) and Loan loss ratio (percentage of loans-to-total assets) proxy for revenue diversification. Non-performing loans 
ratio (percentage of non-performing loans-to-total assets), Loan loss provision ratio (percentage of loan loss provisions-to-total assets) and Loan loss ratio (percentage of loan losses-to-total 
assets) proxy for loan risk. ROA (percentage of net income-to-total assets), Firm size (natural logarithm of total assets) and Leverage (percentage of total assets-to-common equity ratio) are 
control variables capturing profitability, size and leverage, respectively. We source all balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each announcement. The t-test 
evaluates if the means of the respective pairs of subsets are equal. Figures in parentheses show t-values. a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Decomposition of total return risk and bank pre-announcement characteristics 
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 High (H) Low (L) High (H) Low (L) High (H) Low (L) 
Panel A: Diversification 
Period before announcement (day -250 to day -1)     �ோ�ଶ  4.219 4.694 2.967 4.985 3.515 3.372 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  1.816 1.178 0.846 0.417 1.543 1.204 ���ଶ  2.403 3.515 2.121 4.568 1.972 2.168 ߚ 0.905 0.777 0.748 0.453 1.082 0.873 
Period after announcement (day +1 to day +250)     �ଶܴ௜ 4.811 4.845 3.351 5.007 4.644 5.038 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  2.036 1.427 0.911 0.873 2.136 2.351 ���ଶ  2.775 3.418 2.440 4.134 2.508 2.687 ߚ 0.977 0.823 0.876 0.559 1.165 0.884 
Changes in risk post-announcement1     ∆�ଶܴ௜ 0.592 0.151 0.384 0.022 1.129 1.666c ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.220 0.249 0.065 0.456c 0.593 1.147b ∆���ଶ  0.372 -0.097 0.319 -0.434a 0.536 0.519 ∆ߚ 0.072c 0.046 0.128a 0.106 0.083c 0.011 
N 56 54 43 40 26 25 
Difference in risk changes between subsets2    ∆�ଶܴ௜ H-L (0.52) (0.33) -(0.46) ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  H-L -(0.06) -(1.44) -(0.81) ∆���ଶ  H-L (0.85) (0.78) (0.02) ∆ߚ H-L (0.44) (0.28) (1.07) 
Panel B: Risk 
Period before announcement (day -250 to day -1)     �ோ�ଶ  6.811 2.036 5.880 1.867 5.183 1.548 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  2.406 0.672 0.800 0.532 2.102 0.602 ���ଶ  4.405 1.364 5.080 1.335 3.080 0.945 ߚ 0.882 0.810 0.608 0.628 1.052 0.905 
Period after announcement (day +1 to day +250)     �ோ�ଶ  6.950 2.596 5.601 2.404 6.641 2.678 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  2.450 0.992 1.061 0.675 3.127 1.192 ���ଶ  4.500 1.604 4.540 1.729 3.514 1.485 ߚ 0.923 0.879 0.688 0.765 1.091 0.945 
Changes in risk post-announcement1     ∆�ଶܴ௜ 0.139 0.560a -0.279 0.537b 1.458 1.130 ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.044 0.320b 0.261 0.143 1.025c 0.590c ∆���ଶ  0.095 0.240b -0.540 0.394b 0.434 0.540 ∆ߚ 0.041 0.069b 0.080 0.137a 0.039 0.040 
N 63 62 47 46 27 27 
Difference in risk changes between subsets2    ∆�ଶܴ௜ H-L (-0.54) -(0.86) (0.30) ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  H-L -(0.69) (0.47) (0.68) ∆���ଶ  H-L -(0.28) -(1.11) -(0.16) ∆ߚ H-L -(0.51) -(0.76) -(0.00) 
Panel C: Size 
Period before announcement (day -250 to day -1)     �ோ�ଶ  4.721 4.193 2.945 5.008 3.561 3.201 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  2.186 0.844 0.834 0.431 1.452 1.235 ���ଶ  2.535 3.349 2.112 4.577 2.109 1.966 ߚ 1.061 0.631 0.701 0.504 1.106 0.856 
Period after announcement (day +1 to day +250)     �ோ�ଶ  4.728 4.923 3.229 5.138 5.341 3.930 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  2.187 1.304 0.978 0.800 2.969 1.431 ���ଶ  2.541 3.620 2.250 4.338 2.372 2.499 ߚ 1.034 0.774 0.784 0.657 1.196 0.870 
Changes in risk post-announcement1     ∆�ଶܴ௜ 0.007 0.730 0.284 0.130 1.780c 0.729 ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.001 0.460a 0.144 0.369 1.517b 0.196 
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∆���ଶ  0.006 0.271 0.138 -0.239 0.263 0.533 ∆ߚ -0.027 0.143a 0.083b 0.153b 0.090c 0.014 
N 54 56 43 40 24 28 
Difference in risk changes between subsets2    ∆�ଶܴ௜ H-L -(0.86) (0.14) (0.92) ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  H-L -(1.08) -(0.82) (1.94)c ∆���ଶ  H-L -(0.48) (0.39) -(0.41) ∆ߚ H-L -(2.98)a -(0.88) (1.16) 
The Table presents the shift in risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before and after partnership announcements between 
1991 and 2012. The first column identifies the risk measures and statistics; each subsequent column contains the results from subsets of the 
sample. “Bank-Insure” are presents cases when banks bid for insurance companies; “Bank-Agency” and “Bank-Securities” present cases 
when banks bid for insurance agencies/brokers and securities/commodities brokers. Panel A splits the sample based on banks’ pre-
announcement level (median value) of diversification (non-interest income share). Panels B and C split the sample based on the banks’ pre-
announcement level of risk (total risk) and size (total assets). We calculate the risk measures using equations [1] and [2]. Variance terms are 
multiplied by 104. σ2Ri is total risk, β2σ2Rm is the systematic risk component, σ2εi is the idiosyncratic risk component and β is the average beta. 
All risk measures are averaged across firms. σ2Rm is the average variance of market returns. Δs represent changes in the respective variables.  
1A negative value indicates a reduction in risk or other measures, while positive values indicate an increase.  
2T-stat evaluates if the means of the respective pairs of subsets are equal (t-stats in brackets). 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Decomposition of total return risk and bank geography 
 
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 US EU US EU US EU 
 N=47 N=42 N=89 N=4 N=10 N=26 
       
Panel A: Period before announcement (day -250 to day -1)   �ோ�ଶ  3.905 4.432 3.923 2.414 3.386 2.196 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.751 2.033 0.668 0.601 1.329 0.717 ���ଶ  3.153 2.399 3.254 1.813 2.057 1.479 ߚ 0.672 0.988 0.622 0.502 1.167 0.837 
Panel B: Period after announcement (day +1 to day +250)   �ଶܴ௜ 4.256 4.387 4.055 2.450 5.560 3.616 ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  1.152 1.799 0.863 1.010 2.481 1.387 ���ଶ  3.104 2.589 3.192 1.440 3.079 2.229 ߚ 0.826 0.970 0.729 0.637 1.297 0.845 
Panel C: Changes in risk post-announcement1    ∆�ଶܴ௜ 0.351 -0.045 0.132 0.036 2.174c 1.420 ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  0.401b -0.234 0.195 0.409 1.152 0.670c ∆���ଶ  -0.049 0.190 -0.062 -0.373 1.022c 0.750 ∆ߚ 0.154a -0.018 0.107a 0.135c 0.130 0.008 
Panel D: Difference in risk changes between subsets    ∆�ଶܴ௜ US-EU (0.46) (0.19) (0.56) ∆ߚଶ�ோ�ଶ  US-EU (1.43) -(0.75) (0.52) ∆���ଶ  US-EU -(0.40) (0.59) (0.38) ∆ߚ US-EU (2.54)b -(0.52) (1.23) 
The Table presents the shift in risk factors composing total bank bidder return risk before and after partnership announcements between 
1991 and 2012. The first column identifies the risk measures and statistics; each subsequent column contains the results from subsets of the 
sample. “Bank-Insure” presents cases when banks bid for insurance companies; “Bank-Agency” and “Bank-Securities” present cases when 
banks bid for insurance agencies/brokers and securities/commodities brokers. “EU”, “US” and “Other” present deals where the bidder is 
located either in the United States, Europe or other countries. Panels A and B present results from the pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Panel C shows the differences in the risk measures before and after M&A announcements. Panel D evaluates if the means of the respective 
pairs of subsets are equal (t-stats in brackets). We calculate the risk measures using equations [1] and [2]. Variance terms are multiplied by 
104. σ2Ri is total risk, β2σ2Rm is the systematic risk component, σ2εi is the idiosyncratic risk component and β is the average beta. All risk 
measures are averaged across firms. σ2Rm is the average variance of market returns. Δs represent changes in the respective variables.  
1A negative value indicates a reduction in risk or other measures, while positive values indicate an increase. 
a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions 
   �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଶ��ℎ,௜ + ߚଷܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚସ�ܧ�௜ + ߚହܵ��݁௜ + ��  
   
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Panel A: Market Beta       
       Constant 0.492 0.796 -0.062 0.497 -0.838 1.067 
 (5.85)a (6.78)a -(0.38) (2.77)a -(1.53) (7.25)a 
Non-interest income share 0.716 0.183 1.770 0.235 0.845 0.785 
 (3.85)a (0.64) (4.06)a (0.65) (4.07)a (2.46)a 
Loan loss provision ratio 7.829 15.366 33.097 59.629 -4.936 -0.446 
 (1.30) (1.79)c (1.64) (3.03)a -(0.67) -(0.08) 
ROA -0.013 -0.115 0.131 -0.103 0.065 -0.082 
 -(0.50) -(2.42)b (1.37) -(1.26) (1.42) -(1.45) 
Leverage 0.009 -0.001 0.006 0.004 -0.010 -0.012 
 (2.69)a -(0.21) (0.79) (0.74) -(3.35)a -(3.89)a 
Firm size 0.116 0.073 0.083 0.098 0.068 0.079 
 (6.66)a (3.31)a (2.61)b (4.01)a (3.34)a (3.48)a 
N 105 92 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.38 0.41 
F-statistic 11.43 4.19 4.97 2.72 6.95 8.00 
       Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk1       
       
Constant 3.960 1.230 5.590 4.260 -4.830 -0.102 
 (5.97)a (1.81)c (4.62)a (4.61)a -(1.79)c -(0.05) 
Non-interest income share -4.320 -0.216 -11.210 -8.680 0.456 7.890 
 -(2.86)a -(0.10) -(2.57)a -(2.66)a (0.51) (1.33) 
Loan loss provision ratio 117.410 474.500 -173.870 532.080 229.600 28.840 
 (3.06)a (3.81)a -(0.69) (2.33)b (2.10)b (0.79) 
ROA -0.272 0.226 0.366 0.349 0.743 -0.477 
 -(1.75)c (0.57) (0.41) (0.52) (2.41)b -(1.10) 
Leverage -0.028 -0.001 -0.041 -0.014 -0.023 0.014 
 -(1.32) -(0.06) -(0.96) -(0.30) -(1.71)c (0.42) 
Firm size -0.216 -0.389 -0.634 -0.574 0.226 -0.214 
 -(2.02)b -(1.91)c -(1.70)c -(2.74)a (2.05)b -(0.84) 
N 105 92 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.40 0.04 0.22 0.49 0.02 
F-statistic 4.58 13.32 1.59 5.20 10.22 1.20 
       
The Table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, and bank idiosyncratic risk, ���ଶ , on a measure of revenue diversification, and 
proxies for risk, profitability, and size before and after deal announcements where banks bid for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), 
insurance agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. 
Panels A and B present the results from separate estimations of equation [4] when the dependent variable is market beta or idiosyncratic 
risk. Within each Panel, the Table presents estimations for each subsample using pre- and post-announcement data. The first column 
identifies the independent variables. Non-interest income share is proxy for revenue diversification and equals the percentage of non-interest 
income-to-total operating income. Loan loss provision ratio is proxy for loan risk and equals the percentage of loan loss provisions-to-total 
assets. We specify three bank-specific characteristics as control variables; ROA, leverage, and firm size. ROA is the percentage of net 
income-to-total assets; Leverage is the percentage of total assets-to-common equity; and firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. In 
cases where independent variables are correlated with one another, we use auxiliary regressions to make them orthogonal. We source all 
balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each announcement. Figures in brackets show t-values (White 
errors). a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
1All betas are multiplied by 104. 
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Table 7. Market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions: bank characteristics 
   �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଶ��ℎ,௜ + ߚଷܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚସ�ܧ�௜ + ߚହܵ��݁௜ + ߚ଺ܦܦ + ߚ଻ܦܴ + ߚ଼ܦܵ + ��  
   
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Panel A: Market Beta       
       Constant 0.385 0.743 -0.257 0.510 0.314 0.877 
 (3.96)a (5.49)a -(1.28) (2.61)b (0.35) (4.91)a 
Non-interest income share 1.064 -0.007 1.718 -0.055 0.783 0.564 
 (3.24)a -(0.02) (2.71)a -(0.10) (2.57)b (1.65) 
Loan loss provision ratio 11.619 15.826 61.579 51.494 -5.194 0.917 
 (1.80)c (1.62) (1.87)c (2.54)b -(0.87) (0.17) 
ROA -0.014 -0.143 0.221 -0.052 0.062 -0.072 
 -(0.53) -(2.46)b (2.02)b -(0.55) (1.47) -(1.34) 
Leverage 0.014 0.002 0.013 0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (3.31)a (0.35) (1.37) (1.83)c -(2.41)b -(3.68)a 
Firm size 0.145 0.072 0.158 0.129 0.018 0.024 
 (6.86)a (2.41)b (3.48)a (2.90)a (0.53) (0.63) 
DD -0.077 0.104 0.139 0.291 0.012 0.174 
 -(0.79) (0.86) (1.04) (2.30)b (0.11) (1.80)c 
DR 0.066 0.044 0.008 -0.039 0.110 0.052 
 (0.93) (0.54) (0.08) -(0.38) (1.16) (0.60) 
DS -0.242 -0.068 -0.317 -0.273 0.199 0.213 
 -(2.43)b -(0.57) -(1.87)c -(1.43) (1.58) (1.41) 
N 105 91 82 77 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.14 0.23 0.16 0.40 0.44 
F-statistic 8.18 2.79 4.00 2.79 5.08 5.76 
       Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk1       
       
Constant 2.940 0.741 1.060 2.410 -8.330 -2.750 
 (6.72)a (1.02) (0.78) (2.44)a -(1.74)c -(1.24) 
Non-interest income share -4.310 -0.818 2.510 -7.530 -0.476 9.420 
 -(2.85)a -(0.27) (0.69) -(3.29)a -(0.26) (1.81)c 
Loan loss provision ratio 33.470 408.290 -133.550 509.090 196.460 19.030 
 (0.91) (2.97)a -(0.70) (2.39)b (1.82)c (0.44) 
ROA -0.176 0.111 0.690 -0.291 0.608 -0.149 
 -(1.11) (0.27) (0.86) -(0.45) (2.14)b -(0.30) 
Leverage -0.031 0.001 0.038 0.013 -0.010 0.043 
 -(1.95)c (0.03) (0.70) (0.31) -(0.78) (1.35) 
Firm size -0.307 -0.456 -0.474 -0.474 0.340 -0.783 
 -(2.99)a -(2.39)b -(1.46) -(1.55) (1.81)c -(1.74)c 
DD -0.587 -0.108 -1.430 -0.002 0.652 -0.784 
 -(1.86)c -(0.16) -(1.57) (0.00) (1.17) -(0.81) 
DR 2.810 1.510 3.280 2.290 0.930 2.320 
 (9.67)a (3.32)a (4.50)a (3.35)a (3.32)a (2.90)a 
DS 1.070 0.601 -0.722 0.174 -0.541 2.130 
 (2.50)b (0.98) -(1.24) (0.20) -(0.93) (1.37) 
N 105 91 82 77 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.45 0.20 0.33 0.57 0.21 
F-statistic 19.59 10.24 3.53 5.60 9.01 2.61 
       
The Table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, and bank idiosyncratic risk, ���ଶ , on a measure of revenue diversification, and 
proxies for risk, profitability, and size before and after deal announcements where banks bid for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), 
insurance agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. 
Panels A and B present the results from separate estimations of equation [4] when the dependent variable is market beta or idiosyncratic 
risk. Within each Panel, the Table presents estimations for each subsample using pre- and post-announcement data. The first column 
identifies the independent variables. Non-interest income share is proxy for revenue diversification and equals the percentage of non-interest 
income-to-total operating income. Loan loss provision ratio is proxy for loan risk and equals the percentage of loan loss provisions-to-total 
assets. We specify three bank-specific characteristics as control variables; ROA, leverage, and firm size. ROA is the percentage of net 
income-to-total assets; Leverage is the percentage of total assets-to-common equity; and firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
DD, DR and DS are dummy variables equal to one when bank pre-announcement non-interest income share, total risk, and total assets are 
above the median value of the pertinent sample and zero otherwise. In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another, 
we use auxiliary regressions to make them orthogonal. We source all balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and 
after each announcement. Figures in brackets show t-values (White errors). a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
1All betas are multiplied by 104. 
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Table 8. Market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions: Size interactions 
   �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦܵ + ߚଶܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଷ��ℎ,௜ + ߚସܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚହ�ܧ�௜ + ߚ଺ܵ��݁௜ + ܦܵ × (ߚ଻ܦ��௞,௜ + ߚ଼��ℎ,௜ + ߚଽܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚଵ଴�ܧ�௜ + ߚଵଵܵ��݁௜) + ��  
   
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Panel A: Market Beta       
       Constant 0.483 0.902 -1.287 0.302 -0.323 1.268 
 (4.66)a (4.69)a -(2.81)a (0.78) -(0.21) (6.74)a 
DS 0.115 0.261 1.563 0.332 0.340 -0.213 
 (0.28) (0.90) (3.11)a (0.82) (0.16) -(0.68) 
Non-interest income share 0.583 -0.178 6.012 3.440 0.962 0.154 
 (2.87)a -(0.43) (4.84)a (2.39)b (2.24)a (0.42) 
Loan loss provision ratio 21.012 32.963 173.293 52.823 -8.381 -4.696 
 (2.32)b (1.41) (1.73)c (1.86)c -(1.61) -(0.60) 
ROA -0.027 -0.184 0.435 0.035 0.098 0.059 
 -(0.93) -(2.14)b (2.26)b (0.24) (2.15)b (0.66) 
Leverage 0.012 -0.004 0.026 0.011 -0.012 -0.015 
 (2.17)b -(0.68) (1.00) (0.57) -(2.20)b -(6.46)a 
Firm size 0.158 0.110 0.420 0.442 0.048 0.081 
 (7.17)a (3.75)a (4.71)a (3.96)a (0.87) (1.35) 
DS × Non-interest income 
share 0.731 0.653 -4.578 -2.898 -0.981 1.050 
 (2.14)b (1.40) -(3.62)a -(2.00)b -(1.80)c (1.66) 
DS × Loan loss provision 
ratio -17.835 -19.257 -149.976 -43.517 14.452 -2.515 
 -(1.56) -(0.81) -(1.48) -(1.14) (0.99) -(0.11) 
DS × ROA -0.037 0.163 -0.482 -0.106 -0.108 -0.190 
 -(0.61) (1.58) -(2.26)b -(0.57) -(1.63) -(1.46) 
DS × Leverage -0.011 -0.007 -0.017 -0.010 0.010 0.008 
 -(1.02) -(0.88) -(0.64) -(0.52) (1.60) (1.04) 
DS × Firm size -0.132 -0.155 -0.390 -0.422 -0.008 -0.099 
 -(2.01)b -(3.21)a -(4.21)a -(3.66)a -(0.10) -(1.30) 
N 105 91 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 0.15 0.43 0.23 0.41 0.43 
F-statistic 6.43 2.49 6.49 3.10 4.06 4.46 
       Panel B: Idiosyncratic 
Risk1     
  
       
Constant 4.460 0.891 3.030 3.300 -4.800 -3.880 
 (5.65)a (0.77) (0.68) (1.47) -(0.86) -(1.07) 
DS -0.448 5.640 -2.230 0.471 -3.320 6.110 
 -(0.10) (1.36) -(0.48) (0.18) -(0.35) (1.19) 
Non-interest income share -5.410 3.190 -33.690 -13.430 2.900 11.370 
 -(2.87)a (0.99) -(1.98)a -(1.41) (2.01)c (1.48) 
Loan loss provision ratio 25.640 207.700 -1497.670 639.000 328.210 122.580 
 (0.38) (1.28) -(0.92) (2.33)b (4.45)a (1.29) 
ROA -0.105 0.967 3.130 0.788 1.150 -0.291 
 -(0.57) (1.69)c (0.97) (0.71) (3.94)a -(0.32) 
Leverage -0.048 0.010 0.316 0.066 0.009 0.063 
 -(1.70)c (0.23) (0.97) (0.34) (0.44) (1.58) 
Firm size -0.476 -0.587 -1.360 -1.220 0.162 -1.100 
 -(2.71)a -(2.23)b -(1.03) -(1.81)c (0.72) -(1.39) 
DS × Non-interest income 
share 2.040 -8.700 32.910 6.570 -6.590 -5.050 
 (0.39) -(2.28)b (1.90)c (0.66) -(3.02)a -(0.47) 
DS × Loan loss provision 
ratio 109.970 362.750 1703.190 -302.290 -346.450 -193.370 
 (1.01) (2.20)b (1.04) -(0.75) -(3.84)a -(1.49) 
DS × ROA -0.726 -1.120 -2.650 -0.233 -1.090 -0.299 
 -(1.06) -(1.55) -(0.80) -(0.15) -(2.77)a -(0.25) 
DS × Leverage 0.032 -0.135 -0.314 -0.090 -0.029 -0.115 
 (0.35) -(1.29) -(0.96) -(0.46) -(1.13) -(1.61) 
DS × Firm size 0.264 -0.383 1.370 1.040 0.234 0.936 
 (0.42) -(0.56) (1.03) (1.47) (0.69) (0.92) 
N 105 91 82 77 49 51 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.48 0.11 0.19 0.65 0.01 
F-statistic 3.04 8.66 1.94 2.61 9.12 1.06 
       
The Table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, and bank idiosyncratic risk, ���ଶ , on a measure of revenue diversification, and 
proxies for risk, profitability, and size before and after deal announcements where banks bid for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), 
insurance agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. 
Panels A and B present the results from separate estimations of equation [4] when the dependent variable is market beta or idiosyncratic 
risk. Within each Panel, the Table presents estimations for each subsample using pre-announcement and post-announcement data. The first 
column identifies the independent variables. DS is a dummy variable equal to one when bank pre-announcement total assets are above the 
median value of the pertinent sample and zero otherwise. Non-interest income share is proxy for revenue diversification and equals the 
percentage of non-interest income-to-total operating income. Loan loss provision ratio is proxy for loan risk and equals the percentage of 
loan loss provisions-to-total assets. We specify three bank-specific characteristics as control variables; ROA, leverage, and firm size. ROA 
is the percentage of net income-to-total assets; Leverage is the percentage of total assets-to-common equity; and firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another, we use auxiliary regressions to make them 
orthogonal. We source all balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each announcement. Figures in 
brackets indicate t-values (White errors). a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
1All betas are multiplied by 104. 
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Table 9. Market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions: Risk interactions 
   �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦܴ + ߚଶܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଷ��ℎ,௜ + ߚସܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚହ�ܧ�௜ + ߚ଺ܵ��݁௜ + ܦܴ × (ߚ଻ܦ��௞,௜ + ߚ଼��ℎ,௜ + ߚଽܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚଵ଴�ܧ�௜ + ߚଵଵܵ��݁௜) + ��  
   
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Panel A: Market Beta       
       Constant 0.681 0.879 -0.174 0.570 -1.599 1.052 
 (5.39)a (5.47)a -(0.68) (1.43) -(1.83)c (3.32)a 
DR -0.291 -0.036 -0.061 -0.162 2.848 0.465 
 -(1.56) -(0.12) -(0.15) -(0.33) (2.47)a (1.17) 
Non-interest income share 0.417 0.045 2.050 0.019 1.270 0.413 
 (1.14) (0.15) (2.76)a (0.02) (5.86)a (0.54) 
Loan loss provision ratio -29.373 -13.252 34.348 122.147 0.736 10.972 
 -(1.10) -(0.48) (0.91) (2.83)a (0.02) (0.62) 
ROA -0.028 -0.103 0.210 0.232 0.132 0.062 
 -(0.86) -(1.06) (1.52) (1.60) (0.84) (0.47) 
Leverage 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009 
 (1.48) -(0.16) -(0.05) -(0.39) -(1.23) -(2.14)b 
Firm size 0.107 0.044 0.041 0.073 0.089 0.121 
 (3.48)a (1.31) (0.81) (2.11)b (2.20)b (4.10)a 
DR × Non-interest income 
share 0.429 0.287 -0.338 0.337 -2.029 0.113 
 (0.89) (0.41) -(0.34) (0.31) -(4.47)a (0.14) 
DR × Loan loss provision 
ratio 40.421 31.723 -34.506 -60.807 -15.850 -18.336 
 (1.44) (1.07) -(0.74) -(1.16) -(0.41) -(0.94) 
DR × ROA -0.013 -0.061 -0.063 -0.567 -0.148 -0.228 
 -(0.17) -(0.50) -(0.30) -(2.61)b -(0.91) -(1.58) 
DR × Leverage 0.008 -0.006 0.029 0.011 -0.015 -0.021 
 (1.00) -(0.61) (1.23) (0.60) -(1.59) -(1.98)c 
DR × Firm size 0.004 0.047 0.106 0.032 -0.071 -0.091 
 (0.11) (1.03) (1.45) (0.65) -(1.53) -(2.39)b 
N 105 92 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.12 0.18 0.10 0.51 0.46 
F-statistic 5.50 2.11 2.60 1.75 5.49 4.94 
       Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk1       
       
Constant 2.140 1.670 3.170 3.000 -1.920 -1.620 
 (9.35)a (4.41)a (10.50)a (3.21)a -(1.54) -(0.41) 
DR 3.200 -1.050 -1.150 -0.056 -4.300 1.240 
 (3.67)a -(0.56) -(0.35) -(0.03) -(0.70) (0.25) 
Non-interest income share -1.040 0.509 -4.140 -7.250 0.634 5.380 
 -(1.67)c (0.64) -(6.46)a -(2.56)b (1.47) (0.50) 
Loan loss provision ratio -93.760 148.080 -33.610 162.600 17.330 182.220 
 -(2.29)b (1.46) -(0.61) (2.34)b (0.28) (1.81)c 
ROA 0.104 0.538 -0.693 -1.250 0.253 -0.308 
 (2.20)b (2.20)b -(3.53)a -(3.65)a (1.16) -(0.18) 
Leverage -0.015 -0.024 0.017 0.014 -0.007 0.050 
 -(2.50)b -(2.79)a (2.62)b (0.89) -(1.17) (0.96) 
Firm size -0.199 -0.136 -0.087 -0.040 0.095 -0.142 
 -(2.61)b -(1.92)c -(1.45) -(0.40) (1.80)c -(0.55) 
DR × Non-interest income 
share -5.340 -2.300 -3.160 -1.830 1.830 6.750 
 -(2.97)a -(0.43) -(0.53) -(0.42) (0.56) (0.54) 
DR × Loan loss provision 
ratio 177.580 253.310 -235.820 633.010 200.570 -214.290 
 (3.80)a (1.54) -(0.80) (2.53)b (1.42) -(1.95)c 
DR × ROA -1.010 -0.081 1.640 0.890 0.425 -0.031 
 -(4.86)a -(0.12) (1.18) (0.53) (0.83) -(0.02) 
DR × Leverage 0.020 0.158 0.266 0.113 0.001 -0.010 
 (0.54) (2.11)b (0.91) (0.83) (0.03) -(0.10) 
DR × Firm size -0.122 -0.454 -1.190 -0.868 0.169 -0.046 
 -(0.83) -(1.35) -(1.34) -(2.63)b (0.84) -(0.14) 
N 105 92 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.50 0.20 0.39 0.53 0.16 
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F-statistic 17.37 9.19 2.83 5.41 6.00 1.87 
       
The Table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, and bank idiosyncratic risk, ���ଶ , on a measure of revenue diversification, and 
proxies for risk, profitability, and size before and after deal announcements where banks bid for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), 
insurance agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. 
Panels A and B present the results from separate estimations of equation [4] when the dependent variable is market beta or idiosyncratic 
risk. Within each Panel, the Table presents estimations for each subsample using pre-announcement and post-announcement data. The first 
column identifies the independent variables. DR is a dummy variable equal to one when bank pre-announcement total risk is above the 
median value of the pertinent sample and zero otherwise. Non-interest income share is proxy for revenue diversification and equals the 
percentage of non-interest income-to-total operating income. Loan loss provision ratio is proxy for loan risk and equals the percentage of 
loan loss provisions-to-total assets. We specify three bank-specific characteristics as control variables; ROA, leverage, and firm size. ROA 
is the percentage of net income-to-total assets; Leverage is the percentage of total assets-to-common equity; and firm size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. In cases where independent variables are correlated with one another, we use auxiliary regressions to make them 
orthogonal. We source all balance sheet and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each announcement. Figures in 
brackets show t-values (White errors). a/b/c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
1All betas are multiplied by 104. 
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Table 10. Market beta and idiosyncratic risk regressions: Diversification interactions 
   �௝,௜ = ߙ + ߚଵܦܦ + ߚଶܦ��௞,௜ + ߚଷ��ℎ,௜ + ߚସܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚହ�ܧ�௜ + ߚ଺ܵ��݁௜ + ܦܦ × (ߚ଻ܦ��௞,௜ + ߚ଼��ℎ,௜ + ߚଽܴ�ܣ௜ + ߚଵ଴�ܧ�௜ + ߚଵଵܵ��݁௜) + ��  
   
 Bank-Insure Bank-Agency Bank-Securities 
 Before After Before After Before After 
Panel A: Market Beta       
       Constant 0.369 0.685 -0.149 0.405 -1.311 0.925 
 (1.95)c (3.43)a -(0.48) (1.97)c -(1.41) (3.36)a 
DD 0.078 0.267 0.001 0.472 0.754 0.402 
 (0.30) (0.87) (0.00) (0.85) (0.63) (1.18) 
Non-interest income share 1.821 0.163 4.036 0.117 -0.104 0.617 
 (1.65) (0.20) (1.70)c (0.15) -(0.10) (0.76) 
Loan loss provision ratio 6.681 9.992 -0.222 66.508 18.664 16.461 
 (0.72) (1.14) (0.00) (3.86)a (1.13) (1.04) 
ROA -0.012 -0.210 0.075 -0.175 0.072 -0.072 
 -(0.26) -(2.28)b (0.59) -(1.59) (0.90) -(0.71) 
Leverage 0.010 0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.009 -0.010 
 (2.48)b (1.75)c (0.40) (1.17) -(1.29) -(2.20)b 
Firm size 0.122 0.082 0.101 0.149 0.088 0.074 
 (4.68)a (2.92)a (1.65) (4.08)a (2.48)b (2.23)b 
DD × Non-interest income 
share -1.072 0.070 -3.203 -0.369 0.950 -0.398 
 -(0.94) (0.08) -(1.30) -(0.38) (0.84) -(0.46) 
DD × Loan loss provision ratio 3.601 36.221 20.463 -99.834 -31.126 -25.868 
 (0.26) (1.80)c (0.35) -(1.05) -(1.78)c -(1.46) 
DD × ROA 0.031 0.051 0.145 0.372 -0.008 0.036 
 (0.34) (0.42) (0.70) (1.21) -(0.09) (0.28) 
DD × Leverage 0.000 -0.019 0.021 0.008 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.01) -(2.28)b (0.65) (0.30) -(0.26) -(0.20) 
DD × Firm size -0.003 -0.049 -0.017 -0.122 -0.029 0.011 
 -(0.08) -(0.98) -(0.24) -(2.18)b -(0.64) (0.22) 
N 105 91 82 77 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.31 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.33 0.40 
F-statistic 5.15 2.67 2.61 2.19 3.17 3.87 
       Panel B: Idiosyncratic Risk1       
       
Constant 6.380 0.624 2.690 5.130 -8.330 -1.040 
 (3.86)a (0.38) (0.58) (3.56)a -(5.07)a -(0.31) 
DD -5.830 0.970 -1.910 -1.960 6.280 -1.090 
 -(3.03)a (0.53) -(0.36) -(0.75) (2.06)b -(0.27) 
Non-interest income share -14.670 4.030 21.280 -18.480 -4.120 9.660 
 -(1.51) (0.53) (0.74) -(2.81)a -(1.54) (1.12) 
Loan loss provision ratio 127.410 520.030 -772.390 797.620 2.110 80.630 
 (2.21)b (3.37)a -(0.92) (5.92)a (0.05) (0.60) 
ROA -0.282 0.716 0.858 2.010 0.093 -0.125 
 -(1.05) (1.21) (0.42) (2.17)b (0.56) -(0.15) 
Leverage -0.076 -0.013 -0.014 0.004 -0.033 0.048 
 -(2.67)a -(0.48) -(0.19) (0.07) -(2.60)b (0.95) 
Firm size -0.353 -0.340 -2.690 -0.989 0.409 0.326 
 -(2.15)b -(1.10) -(1.62) -(2.79)a (5.82)a (1.20) 
DD × Non-interest income 
share 15.910 -7.450 -20.630 17.010 4.570 2.610 
 (1.63) -(0.94) -(0.71) (2.38)b (1.48) (0.25) 
DD × Loan loss provision ratio 37.140 -191.940 895.590 -598.870 329.420 57.700 
 (0.43) -(0.72) (1.04) -(1.68)c (5.06)a (0.37) 
DD × ROA -0.218 -0.580 -0.542 -2.320 0.875 -1.820 
 -(0.48) -(0.70) -(0.25) -(1.63) (3.27)a -(1.41) 
DD × Leverage 0.115 0.074 0.039 -0.046 0.020 0.012 
 (2.51)b (1.13) (0.23) -(0.26) (1.07) (0.15) 
DD × Firm size 0.310 0.024 2.570 0.587 -0.300 -1.640 
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 (1.43) (0.06) (1.54) (1.21) -(2.51)b -(2.62)b 
N 105 91 82 77 49 51 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.40 0.13 0.30 0.68 0.18 
F-statistic 4.29 6.50 2.08 3.93 10.28 1.95 
       
The Table presents OLS regressions of bank market beta, β, and bank idiosyncratic risk, ���ଶ , on a measure of revenue diversification, and proxies 
for risk, profitability, and size before and after deal announcements where banks bid for insurance companies (Bank-Insure), insurance 
agencies/brokers (Bank-Agency) and securities/commodities brokers (Bank-Securities). The sample period is 1991 to 2012. Panels A and B 
present the results from separate estimations of equation [4] when the dependent variable is market beta or idiosyncratic risk. Within each Panel, 
the Table presents estimations for each subsample using pre-announcement and post-announcement data. The first column identifies the 
independent variables. DD is a dummy variable equal to one when bank pre-announcement non-interest income share is above the median value 
of the pertinent sample and zero otherwise. Non-interest income share is proxy for revenue diversification and equals the percentage of non-
interest income-to-total operating income. Loan loss provision ratio is proxy for loan risk and equals the percentage of loan loss provisions-to-
total assets. We specify three bank-specific characteristics as control variables; ROA, leverage, and firm size. ROA is the percentage of net 
income-to-total assets; Leverage is the percentage of total assets-to-common equity; and firm size is the natural logarithm of total assets. In cases 
where independent variables are correlated with one another, we use auxiliary regressions to make them orthogonal. We source all balance sheet 
and income statement variables at year-end prior to and after each announcement. Figures in brackets show t-values (White errors). a/b/c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
1All betas are multiplied by 104. 
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Appendix Table A1. List of Deals 
     
Date 
Announced Acquiring Bank Nationality 
Assets (USD 
mil.) Target Nationality Type 
18/01/1991 Valley National Bank United States 2004.2 Western Security Life Insurance Co United States B - IU 
09/04/1991 Philippine National Bank Philippines - Philippine Charter Insurance Corp Philippines B - IU 
24/04/1991 Schweizerischer Bankverein Switzerland 147072.8 Lippo Securities PT Indonesia B - SF 
26/09/1991 Abbey National Plc United Kingdom 89737.3 Scottish Mutual Intl Plc Ireland B - IU 
10/12/1991 BHF Bank KGaA Germany 25897.3 Financiere Atlas SA France B - SF 
30/04/1992 Credit Commercial de France France 56286.2 Cie Financiere Nobel France B - SF 
01/09/1992 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 294806.6 Deutscher Herold Versicherungs Germany B - IU 
14/09/1992 Mellon Bank Corp,Pittsburgh,PA United States 29355.0 Boston Co United States B - SF 
30/11/1992 BB&T Financial Corp United States 3729.7 West Insurance & Associates United States B - IU 
27/04/1993 First Bank System Inc United States 23527.0 American Bancshares of Mankato Inc United States B - IU 
29/04/1993 BB&T Financial Corp United States 4598.4 Wilkinson Bullock & Co United States B - IA 
01/06/1993 CERUS SA France 2163.0 Societe Financiere de Geneve Switzerland B - SF 
25/06/1993 BB&T Financial Corp United States 4598.4 Ralph Carlton Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IA 
27/09/1993 Metropolitan Financial Corp United States 23527.0 Rocky Mountain Financial Corp United States B - IA 
08/12/1993 Commerzbank AG Germany 143066.9 DBV Holding AG Germany B - IU 
29/04/1994 BB&T Financial Corp United States 5898.4 
Cummings LeGrand Insurance 
Agency Inc United States B - IA 
21/06/1994 Banca Popolare di Bergamo Italy 14325.3 Mare Assicurazioni Italy B - IU 
29/06/1994 Den Danske Bank AS Denmark 52377.2 Baltica Forsikring A/S Denmark B - IU 
21/09/1994 CNB Bancshares Inc United States - Citizens Realty and Insurance Inc United States B - IU 
20/10/1994 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 81119.3 Glacier National Life Assurance United States B - IU 
06/02/1995 Abbey National Plc United Kingdom 147562.1 Pegasus Assurance Group United Kingdom B - IU 
21/02/1995 First Financial Bancorp United States 1916.7 
Independent Bankers Life Insurance 
Co United States B - IU 
15/05/1995 Den Norske Banken ASA Norway 22821.7 Vital Forsikring A/S Norway B - IU 
23/05/1995 Den Danske Bank AS Denmark 55527.1 Danica Denmark B - IU 
26/06/1995 Dresdner Bank AG Germany 257631.9 Kleinwort Benson Group PLC United Kingdom B - SF 
23/10/1995 Mellon Bank Corp,Pittsburgh,PA United States 38644.0 KeyCorp Cleveland, Ohio-Bond United States B - SF 
06/11/1995 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 97954.9 Canada Security Assurance Co Canada B - IU 
01/12/1995 Dresdner Bank AG Germany 257631.9 RCM Capital Management LLC United States B - SF 
26/01/1996 Canadian Western Bank Canada 989.3 Aetna Trust Co Canada B - IU 
31/01/1996 Community First Bankshares Inc United States 2326.8 Wheaton Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IA 
28/03/1996 First American Corp,Tennessee United States 9681.6 Invest Financial Corp United States B - SF 
09/04/1996 First of America Bank Corp United States - Huttenlocher Group United States B - IA 
25/07/1996 Westpac Banking Corp Australia 79017.3 AMPAC Life Australia B - IU 
01/08/1996 Commerce Bancorp Inc United States 2415.9 
Buckelew & Associates, Keystone 
National Insurance  United States B - IU 
29/10/1996 Pinnacle Financial Services Inc United States 220.6 Starke's Inc United States B - IA 
22/11/1996 Commerce Bancorp Inc United States 2415.9 Morrissey Agency United States B - IA 
29/11/1996 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 109075.3 
Mortgage Insurance Company of 
Canada Canada B - IU 
03/01/1997 Zions Bancorp United States 6485.0 Mutual Benefit Life Insurance United States B - IA 
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22/04/1997 Fort Wayne National Corp United States - Ambassador Group Inc United States B - IU 
20/05/1997 Banca Carige SpA Italy 11692.8 Norditalia Assicurazioni SpA Italy B - IU 
20/05/1997 Banca Carige SpA Italy 11692.8 
La Basilese Compagnia 
d'Assicurazioni sulla Vita Switzerland B - IU 
20/05/1997 Banca Carige SpA Italy 11692.8 Basilese Vita Nova SpA Italy B - IU 
01/07/1997 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom 117199.8 Computershare Ltd Australia B - SF 
11/08/1997 Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 388921.9 Winterthur Schweizerische Switzerland B - IU 
25/08/1997 Mellon Bank Corp,Pittsburgh,PA United States 42596.0 Pacific Brokerage Services Inc United States B - SF 
02/10/1997 Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Denmark 80642.3 Trygg-Hansa Forsakrings AB Denmark B - IU 
14/10/1997 Bank of Ireland Ireland 33013.7 New Ireland Holdings PLC Ireland B - IU 
30/11/1997 Centura Bank Inc United States 6292.4 Betts & Co United States B - IU 
11/12/1997 Mellon Bank Corp,Pittsburgh,PA United States 42596.0 Founders Asset Management Inc United States B - SF 
13/01/1998 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 173105.3 Mutual of Omaha-Canadian Life Canada B - IU 
24/03/1998 WesBanco Inc United States 1789.3 Hunter Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
06/04/1998 Citicorp United States 308678.0 Travelers Group United States B - IU 
13/04/1998 Hibernia Corp United States 10992.4 FPS Financial Services United States B - IU 
28/04/1998 Webster Financial Corp United States 7003.3 Damman Insurance Associates United States B - IA 
26/05/1998 Colonial Ltd Australia 22314.8 Legal & General Australia Ltd Australia B - IU 
01/07/1998 Commerce Bancorp Inc United States 3939.0 JA Montgomery Inc United States B - IA 
17/08/1998 Colonial Ltd Australia 22314.8 Prudential Corp AU/NZ Ops Australia B - IU 
24/09/1998 Colonial Ltd Australia 22314.8 
Guardian Assurance PLC - Hong 
Kong Operations  Hong Kong B - IU 
29/09/1998 Haven Bancorp United States 1968.7 Century Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
02/11/1998 First Defiance Financial Corp United States 579.3 Insurance Center of Defiance Inc United States B - IA 
17/12/1998 UST Corp United States - Brewer & Lord LLP United States B - IA 
01/01/1999 Dexia SA Belgium 123776.6 Sofaxis France B - IU 
09/02/1999 BIL SA Luxembourg - Versicherung Rekord Germany B - IA 
10/03/1999 Unidanmark A/S Denmark 70261.5 Tryg-Baltica Forsikring Denmark B - IU 
15/03/1999 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Picton Cavanaugh Inc United States B - IA 
23/03/1999 Bank of New York Co Inc,NY United States 63503.0 RBSI Sec Svcs(Hldgs)Ltd Jersey B - SF 
26/04/1999 BancorpSouth Inc United States 5177.6 Stewart Sneed Hewes Group United States B - IU 
30/04/1999 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya SA Spain 155327.8 Adeslas Argentina Argentina B - IU 
20/05/1999 First United Corp United States 641.1 Gonder Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
07/06/1999 Banco Santander Central Hispano Spain 181028.3 Cia de Seguros Mundial Confianca Portugal B - IU 
23/06/1999 Lloyds TSB Group United Kingdom - Scottish Widows United Kingdom B - IU 
24/06/1999 FNB Corp United States 461.1 Gelvin Jackson & Starr Inc United States B - IA 
08/07/1999 Wachovia Corp United States 237363.0 Barry Evans Josephs & Snipes Inc United States B - IU 
14/07/1999 BB&T Corp United States 34427.2 
Beam Cooper Gainey & Associates 
Inc United States B - IA 
15/07/1999 San Paolo IMI Italy 185848.3 
Egida Cie di Assicurazioni e 
Riassicurazioni SpA Italy B - IU 
29/07/1999 Hellenic Bank PCL Cyprus - Ledra Insurance Ltd Cyprus B - IU 
19/09/1999 Dexia SA Belgium 116264.2 Dexia France France B - SF 
28/09/1999 Chase Manhattan Corp,NY United States 626942.0 Hambrecht & Quist Group Inc United States B - SF 
28/10/1999 FNB Corp United States 461.1 Roger Bouchard Insurance Inc United States B - IA 
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02/11/1999 Peoples Bancorp Inc United States 880.3 Lambert Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
02/12/1999 Dexia SA Belgium 116264.2 Dexia France(Dexia Belgium) France B - SF 
16/12/1999 Univest Corp of Pennsylvania United States 1070.5 George Becker Associates United States B - IA 
31/12/1999 Unidanmark A/S Denmark 70261.5 Vesta Forsikring AS Norway B - IU 
11/01/2000 Banco Comercial Portugues SA Portugal 35136.1 Imperio Seguros  Portugal B - IU 
19/01/2000 BPI Philippines 5681.9 Ayala Insurance Holdings Ltd Philippines B - IU 
19/01/2000  Sofinloc Portugal - Contratecar Portugal B - IA 
08/02/2000 Dexia SA Belgium 245887.3 Dexia France (Dexia Belgium) France B - SF 
14/03/2000 Dexia SA Belgium 244948.3 Labouchere NV Netherlands B - IU 
14/03/2000 Dexia SA Belgium 244948.3 
Financial Security Assurance 
Holdings Ltd United States B - IU 
15/03/2000 Dexia SA Belgium 244948.3 White Mountains Holdings United States B - IA 
06/04/2000 Webster Financial Corp United States 9863.0 Folis Wylie & Lane United States B - IA 
25/04/2000 Oneida Financial Corp United States 277.7 Bailey & Haskell Associates Inc United States B - IA 
01/05/2000 Republic Security Financial Corp United States 3175.6 National Horizon Inc United States B - IU 
30/05/2000 Hibernia Corp United States 15240.9 Rosenthal Agency United States B - IA 
07/06/2000 Kredyt Bank PBI SA Poland 3875.7 Agropolisa SA Poland B - IU 
20/06/2000 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 183593.0 Liberty Life Insurance Co  United States B - IU 
20/07/2000 Natexis Banques Populaires France 94953.8 FACTOREM France B - SF 
01/08/2000 FNB Corp United States 515.3 Atlamura Marsh & Associates United States B - IA 
22/08/2000 East West Bancorp Inc United States 2144.3 East West Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
25/08/2000 Huntington Bancshares Inc United States 29037.0 J Rolfe Davis Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IA 
07/09/2000 Abbey National Plc United Kingdom 291305.1 Scottish Provident Institution  United Kingdom B - IU 
10/10/2000 BancorpSouth Inc United States 5776.9 
Pittman Seay & Turner Insurance 
Agency United States B - IA 
12/10/2000 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 832885.2 National Discount Brokers United States B - SF 
24/10/2000 Compass Bancshares Inc United States 18150.8 Texas Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
20/11/2000 BancFirst Corp United States 2335.8 Century Life Assurance Co United States B - IA 
20/12/2000 Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 108017.8 SPP Livforsakring AB Sweden B - IU 
28/12/2000 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 
(BBVA) Spain 154886.6 Hilo Direct Seguros Y Reaseguros SA Spain B - IU 
01/01/2001 Citigroup Inc United States 902210.0 Generar AFJP Argentina B - IU 
05/02/2001 KBC Bank & Insurance Holding NV Belgium 176183.3 K&H Eletbiztosito Hungary B - IU 
08/02/2001 Regions Financial Corp United States 43688.3 Rebsamen Insurance Inc United States B - IU 
28/02/2001 Sterling Bancorp United States 1264.4 American Sterling Corp United States B - IU 
09/03/2001 Wells Fargo & Co United States 272426.0 ACO Brokerage Holdings Corp United States B - IA 
01/05/2001 Mellon Financial Corp United States 50364.0 Bankmark United States B - IA 
22/05/2001 Dexia SA Belgium 242133.6 Kempen & Co NV Netherlands B - SF 
30/05/2001 First Bancorp United States 914.4 Aberdeen Insurance & Realty Co Inc United States B - IU 
30/05/2001 First Bancorp United States 914.4 Hobbs Insurance & Realty Co United States B - IU 
15/06/2001 Suncorp-Metway Ltd Australia 15673.4 AMP General Insurance Ltd Australia B - IU 
05/07/2001 Societe Generale SA France 428005.4 La Marocaine-Vie  Morocco B - IU 
06/07/2001 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Italy 101006.6 Dipras SpA Italy B - IU 
01/10/2001 Sussex Bancorp United States 161.2 Tri-State Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
10/10/2001 Toronto-Dominion Bank Canada 181326.7 TD Waterhouse Group Inc United States B - SF 
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05/11/2001 BB&T Corp United States 59340.2 Cooney Rikard & Curtin Inc United States B - IA 
15/11/2001 Wachovia Corp United States 254170.0 Crawford Slevin & Hicks United States B - IU 
30/11/2001 Den Norske Bank Holding ASA Norway 39000.2 Acta Link Norway B - IA 
03/12/2001 Univest Corp of Pennsylvania United States 1204.2 Gum Insurance United States B - IA 
19/12/2001 Greater Bay Bancorp United States 5130.4 ABD Insurance & Financial Svcs United States B - IU 
09/01/2002 Compass Bancshares Inc United States 23015.0 Horizons Insurance Group Inc United States B - IA 
22/01/2002 Hana Bank South Korea 16974.6 Allianz France Life Insurance Co South Korea B - IU 
30/01/2002 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Celaris Group Inc United States B - IA 
28/03/2002 BNCcorp United States 585.1 Milne Scali & Co United States B - IU 
02/04/2002 Hibernia Corp United States 16596.8 Friedler-LaRocca Financial United States B - IU 
30/04/2002 Royal Bank of Canada Canada 225742.4 Business Men's Assurance United States B - IU 
30/04/2002 Susquehanna Bancshares Inc United States 5051.1 Addis Group Inc  United States B - IU 
01/05/2002 Regions Financial Corp United States 45382.7 ICT Group LLC United States B - IA 
10/06/2002 Main Street Banks Inc United States 1110.2 Hometown Insurance Center Inc United States B - IU 
18/06/2002 Valley National Bancorp United States 8566.0 Masters Coverage Corp United States B - IA 
01/07/2002 Trustmark Corp United States 7167.5 Chandler-Sampson Insurance Inc United States B - IU 
01/08/2002 Community First Bankshares Inc United States 5772.3 Hake Agency United States B - IA 
02/08/2002 Wachovia Corp United States 330452.0 Cameron M Harris & Co United States B - IA 
15/08/2002 First Financial Holdings Inc United States 2325.7 Johnson Insurance Associates Inc United States B - IU 
04/09/2002 Second Bancorp Inc United States 1680.4 Stouffer Herzog United States B - IU 
11/09/2002 FNB Corp United States 953.3 Harry Blackwood Inc United States B - IA 
24/09/2002 South Financial Group Inc United States 6029.4 Gardner Associates Inc United States B - IA 
25/09/2002 Waypoint Financial Corp United States 5372.2 Keystone Future Care United States B - IA 
25/09/2002 Waypoint Financial Corp United States 5372.2 Insurance Brokers of York United States B - IA 
01/10/2002 Leesport Financial Corp United States 503.5 Boothby Group United States B - IU 
02/10/2002 BB&T Corp United States 70869.9 Landrum-Yaeger & Associates Inc United States B - IA 
09/10/2002 First Bancorp United States 1144.4 Uwharrie Insurance Group Inc United States B - IA 
23/10/2002 Old National Bancorp United States 9080.5 Terrill Group Inc United States B - IA 
19/12/2002 Team Financial Inc United States 650.3 Quarles Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
23/12/2002 Community Banks Inc United States 1509.7 Shultz Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IA 
16/01/2003 Sussex Bancorp United States 225.9 Garrera Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
12/03/2003 Compass Bancshares Inc United States 23884.7 Mueller & Associates Inc United States B - IA 
24/03/2003 First Financial Holdings Inc United States 2264.7 Woodruff & Co Inc United States B - IA 
01/04/2003 Associated Banc-Corp United States 15043.3 CFG Insurance Services Inc United States B - IU 
10/04/2003 Old National Bancorp United States 9612.6 James L Will Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IA 
22/04/2003 Sun Bancorp Inc United States 2105.3 Mid Penn Insurance Associates Inc United States B - IA 
30/04/2003 BancorpSouth Inc United States 10189.2 WMS LLC United States B - IA 
30/05/2003 Bank One Corp United States 277383.0 Zurich Life United States B - IU 
11/06/2003 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC United Kingdom 663278.8 Churchill Insurance Co Ltd United Kingdom B - IU 
26/06/2003 FNB Corp United States 992.3 Lupfer-Frakes Insurance United States B - IU 
02/07/2003 SanPaolo IMI SpA Italy 211937.9 Noricum Vita Italy B - IU 
03/07/2003 Community Banks Inc United States 1679.9 Your Insurance Partner United States B - IU 
07/07/2003 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Insurance Buyers' Service Agency Inc United States B - IA 
10/07/2003 Old National Bancorp United States 9612.6 Insurance & Risk Management United States B - IA 
14/07/2003 BancorpSouth Inc United States 10189.2 Ramsey Krug Farrell & Lensing Inc United States B - IA 
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25/07/2003 Hudson United Bancorp United States 7651.3 Flatiron Credit Co Inc United States B - IA 
08/08/2003 Hancock Holding Co United States 3973.1 Magna Insurance Co United States B - IU 
14/08/2003 Oneida Financial Corp United States 416.7 MacDonald Yando Agency Inc United States B - IA 
27/08/2003 Kookmin Bank South Korea - Hanil Life Insurance South Korea B - IU 
31/08/2003 Punjab National Bank India 18560.8 Principal PNB Asst Mgmt Co Ltd India B - SF 
02/09/2003 German American Bancorp United States 957.0 Hoosierland Agency United States B - IA 
02/09/2003 German American Bancorp United States 957.0 Stafford Williams Agency United States B - IA 
24/09/2003 Leesport Financial Corp United States 562.4 CrosStates Insurance Consultants Inc United States B - IA 
29/09/2003 Regions Financial Corp United States 47938.8 Merchants Insurance Services Inc United States B - IA 
01/10/2003 Community First Bankshares Inc United States 5827.2 Summit Insurance Group United States B - IA 
21/10/2003 Banco Itau Holding Financeira SA Brazil 30313.2 
AGF Brazil (Life and Asset Mngmt 
Units) Brazil B - IU 
05/12/2003 Main Street Banks Inc United States 1382.0 Banks Moneyhan Hayes Insurance United States B - IU 
05/01/2004 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Spencer Patterson Agency Inc United States B - IA 
13/01/2004 Sterling Financial Corp United States - Corporate Healthcare Strategies United States B - IA 
02/02/2004 First Financial Holdings Inc United States 2322.9 Kimbrell Insurance Group United States B - IU 
13/02/2004 San Paolo IMI Italy 253487.7 Fideuram Vita SpA Italy B - IU 
18/02/2004 Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC United Kingdom 815010.5 SOC Group PLC-SOCM Unit United Kingdom B - IU 
01/03/2004 Summit Financial Group Inc United States 791.5 Sager Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
02/03/2004 Canadian Western Bank Canada 3289.5 HSBC Canadian Direct Insurance Inc Canada B - IU 
03/03/2004 First Financial Bancorp United States 3949.8 White & Havens Insurance Services United States B - IA 
01/04/2004 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - EOB Inc United States B - IA 
01/07/2004 Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 175178.3 SPP Fondforsakring AB Sweden B - IU 
01/07/2004 National Penn Bancshares Inc United States 3510.8 Pennsurance Inc United States B - IA 
09/07/2004 UBS AG Switzerland 1247800.0 Giubergia UBS SIM SpA Italy B - SF 
26/07/2004 FNB Corp United States 1325.5 Morrell Butz & Junker Inc United States B - IA 
07/09/2004 Mellon Financial,Pittsburgh,PA United States 33983.0 Providence Group Investment United States B - SF 
06/10/2004 Compass Bancshares Inc United States 26963.1 Sevier Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
02/11/2004 Trustmark Corp United States 7891.0 Fisher-Brown Inc United States B - IA 
02/12/2004 Landesbank Berlin Holding AG Germany 191032.4 MLP AG Germany B - SF 
08/12/2004 National Penn Bancshares Inc United States 3510.8 D E Love Associates Inc United States B - IA 
14/12/2004 Univest Corp of Pennsylvania United States 1657.2 Donald K Martin & Co United States B - IU 
03/01/2005 S&T Bancorp Inc United States 2989.0 Cowhernehrig & Co United States B - IA 
03/01/2005 S&T Bancorp Inc United States 2989.0 Bennett Associates Inc United States B - IA 
10/01/2005 UBS AG Switzerland 1523000.0 Etra SIM SpA Italy B - SF 
11/01/2005 UBS AG Switzerland 1523000.0 China Dragon Fund Mgmt Co Ltd China B - SF 
13/01/2005 Compass Bancshares Inc United States 28184.6 Warren Benefits Group LP United States B - IA 
11/02/2005 FoereningsSparbanken AB Sweden 153677.9 AS Hansapank Estonia B - SF 
18/02/2005 Bancolombia SA Colombia 7422.9 Corfinsura Colombia B - SF 
03/03/2005 Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd Hong Kong 5417.8 Liu Chong Hing Insurance Co Ltd  Hong Kong B - IU 
11/03/2005 ICICI Bank Ltd India 40789.5 Prudential ICICI Asset Mgmt Co India B - SF 
30/03/2005 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom 1335100.0 ASK Finance Ltd United Kingdom B - SF 
30/03/2005 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom 1335100.0 FS Compliance Ltd United Kingdom B - SF 
01/04/2005 BancorpSouth Inc United States 10848.2 Kyzar & Co United States B - IU 
01/04/2005 Old National Bancorp United States 8898.3 JWF Insurance Cos Inc United States B - IU 
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05/04/2005 Wachovia Corp United States 493324.0 Palmer & Cay Inc United States B - IA 
27/04/2005 Thai Military Bank PCL Thailand 17227.0 Macquarie Sec(Thailand)Ltd Thailand B - SF 
19/05/2005 Regions Financial Corp United States 84106.4 Galbreath Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
06/06/2005 South Financial Group Inc United States 13789.8 Bowditch Insurance Corp United States B - IU 
18/06/2005 DBS Group Holdings Ltd Singapore 107582.2 CIFCL India B - SF 
12/09/2005 OKO Bank Finland 22328.8 Pohjola-Yhtyma Oyj Finland B - IU 
28/09/2005 UBS AG Switzerland 1523000.0 Beijing Securities Co Ltd China B - SF 
04/10/2005 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Becker-McDowell Agency Inc United States B - IU 
04/10/2005 Sky Financial Group Inc United States - Steiner Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IU 
07/10/2005 Alliance Bancshares Corp United States 479.7 Danaher Insurance Agency United States B - IA 
13/10/2005 Enterprise Financial Services Corp United States 1055.2 Millenium Brokerage Group United States B - IA 
22/11/2005 TD Banknorth Inc United States 28566.3 Boothby & Bartlett Co United States B - IA 
02/12/2005 South Financial Group Inc United States 13789.8 Lossing Insurance Agency Inc United States B - IU 
03/03/2006 Credit Suisse Group AG Switzerland 1018100.0 Woori F&I Co Ltd South Korea B - SF 
23/06/2006 Banco Popolare di Verona & Novara SpA Italy 70084.3 ABC Assicura Italy B - IU 
27/06/2006 Fortis SA/NV Belgium - Cinergy Marketing & Trading LP United States B - SF 
29/06/2006 Oversea-Chinese Bkg Corp Ltd Singapore 81019.1 Great Eastern Holdings Ltd Singapore B - IU 
29/06/2006 First Financial Holdings Inc United States 2522.4 Employer Benefits Strategies Inc United States B - IA 
04/09/2006 Credit Agricole SA France 1256000.0 Phoenix Metrolife Emporiki Greece B - IU 
10/10/2006 Beneficial Mutual Bancorp Inc United States 2300.2 CLA Agency Inc United States B - IA 
31/10/2006 Fortis SA/NV Belgium - Gutingia Lebensversicherung AG Germany B - IU 
14/12/2006 Hanmi Financial Corp United States 3413.2 All World Insurance Svcs Inc United States B - IA 
26/01/2007 UKIO Bankas AB Lithuania 1223.3 Bonum Publicum Lithuania B - IU 
19/02/2007 ANZ Banking Group Ltd Australia 347918.3 eTrade Australia Ltd Australia B - SF 
26/02/2007 JPMorgan Chase & Co United States 1351520.0 Integrated Investment Services United States B - SF 
12/05/2007 Doha Bank(QSC) Qatar 5959.5 Select Securities Ltd India B - SF 
09/07/2007 Hiroshima Bank Ltd Japan 52489.0 Utsumiya Securities-Retail Japan B - SF 
20/08/2007 DnB NOR ASA Norway 211411.2 SalusAnsvar AB Sweden B - IU 
24/09/2007 National Bank of Greece SA Greece 100987.7 Ethniki General Insurance Co Greece B - IU 
02/10/2007 Shore Bancshares Inc United States 945.6 TSGIA Inc & Subsidiaries United States B - IU 
02/10/2007 Shore Bancshares Inc United States 945.6 Jack Martin & Associates Inc United States B - IU 
19/12/2007 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC Utd Arab Em 22077.5 RHB Capital Bhd Malaysia B - SF 
31/12/2007 Enterprise Finl Svcs Corp United States 1535.6 Millenium Brokerage Group United States B - IA 
10/01/2008 Deutsche Bank AG Germany 2946300.0 BATS Global Markets Inc United States B - SF 
14/01/2008 Wachovia Corp,Charlotte,NC United States 782896.0 Heritage Indemnity Co United States B - IU 
28/05/2008 Standard Bank Group Ltd South Africa 172283.9 Libhold South Africa B - IU 
05/06/2008 Kas Bank NV Netherlands 12208.6 Delta Lloyd Investment Germany B - SF 
07/07/2008 Banco do Brasil SA Brazil 201096.3 Cia de Seguros Alianca Brazil B - IU 
26/08/2008 Latvijas Krajbanka AS Latvia 1404.2 Balta Insurance Co Latvia B - IU 
27/08/2008 Bank of Yokohama Ltd Japan 120063.3 Hamagin Tokai Tokyo Securities Japan B - SF 
10/09/2008 Bumiputra-Commerce Hldg Bhd Malaysia 59852.8 Asuransi Jiwa John Hancock Indonesia B - IU 
17/09/2008 Solomon Mutual Savings Bank South Korea 3417.4 Green Fire Marine Insurance Co South Korea B - IU 
23/09/2008 Banca Popolare di Milano SCARL Italy 63621.3 Anima SGR SpA Italy B - SF 
08/10/2008 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia 466557.6 St Andrew's Australia Pty Ltd Australia B - IU 
03/11/2008 Banco Itau Holding Financeira Brazil 165753.9 Banco Itau Europa SA Portugal B - SF 
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18/12/2008 ICBC(Asia) Hong Kong 24655.9 Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd China B - IU 
13/01/2009 Bank of Montreal,Ontario,CA Canada 359284.1 AIG Life Ins Co of Canada Canada B - IU 
17/07/2009 Banca Popolare di Milano SCARL Italy 62842.5 Bipiemme Vita SpA Italy B - IU 
22/10/2009 HSBC United Kingdom 2527500.0 Bao Viet Holdings Vietnam B - IU 
25/03/2010 Nishi-Nippon City Bank Ltd Japan 77995.4 Nishi-Nippon City TT Securitie Japan B - SF 
23/06/2010 Punjab National Bank India 67534.9 Principal PNB Life Insurance India B - IU 
18/01/2011 TowneBank,Portsmouth,Virginia United States 3871.0 WT Chapin Insurance United States B - IU 
28/03/2011 Chinatrust Financial Holding Taiwan 5446.4 MetLife Taiwan Insurance Co Taiwan B - IU 
29/03/2011 Industrial Bank Co Ltd China 280691.6 Union Trust Ltd China B - SF 
19/05/2011 Siam Commercial Bank PCL Thailand 49134.4 SICCO Securities PCL Thailand B - SF 
06/06/2011 Kiatnakin Bank PCL Thailand 4721.3 Siam City Asset Mgmt Co Ltd Thailand B - SF 
30/06/2011 Citigroup Inc United States 1913902.0 Horizon Securities Corp Vietnam B - SF 
12/07/2011 Industrial Bank Co Ltd China 280691.6 China Industrial Intl Trust China B - SF 
09/12/2011 Kiatnakin Bank PCL Thailand 4721.3 Phatra Capital PCL Thailand B - SF 
03/02/2012 BB&T Corp United States 174579.0 Crump Life Insurance Services United States B - IU 
11/04/2012 Banco Espirito Santo SA Portugal 103987.6 BES Vida Cia de Seguros SA Portugal B - IU 
09/08/2012 CaixaBank SA Spain 350470.3 Undisclosed Insurance JV Spain B - IU 
The Table presents details of the sample of deals. The sample consists of available international data collected for 272 publicly announced deals between 1991 and 2012. 
Information on deals is obtained by Thomson One Banker. The assets figures are reported in real terms, as per the year-end before the deal announcement(s). The last column 
reports the type of deal; B – IU are deals where the bidder is a bank and the target an insurance company/underwriter (Bank-Insure). B – IA are deals where the bidder is a bank 
and the target an insurance agency/broker (Bank-Agency). B – SF are deals where the bidder is a bank and the target a securities/commodities broker (Bank-Securities). 
 
 
 
 
